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Abstract 
 
The question of why agents adopt new norms have been adressed by a number of scholars, 
pointing at the importance of incentives as well as identification. Yet, less attention has been 
directed towards how norm promoters understand strategies for spreading values. More 
specifically, previous research has failed to consider the crucial role played by the officials 
assigned to convert the political goal of promoting values into functional policies. Aiming to 
bridge this gap as well as to increase our knowledge of the EU‟s newest foreign policy initiative, 
the Eastern Partnership, this thesis examines how the officials involved in the policy preparations 
reason about strategies for norm promotion. What assumptions were the basis for the 
discussions and how are the mechanisms of norm promotion understood? Interviews with civil 
servants representing the European Commission and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
indicate that offering incentives and fostering socialisation are considered mutually reinforcing 
strategies which should be combined rather than chosen between. Moreover, the result suggests 
that the issue of context-dependency is a determining factor in the process of norm 
promotion/adoption.  
 
Hence, the main conclusion is that the officials regard the ideal strategy for promoting norms as 
one which takes the context of the norm target into account and invokes both the logic of 
consequence and logic of appropriateness.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The reputation of the EU in the world is a good one, based on our strong values of freedom 
and democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights […] The EU must pull its 
weight in areas of crisis and conflict. This is the responsibility of a global actor, but is also 
sound policy for the security of Europe.1 
 
 
In a few sentences Catherine Ashton, the European Union‟s (EU) new High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, accentuates two core features of the Union‟s self conception: 
1) the EU is an important actor in global affairs and 2) the values of democracy and human rights 
are essential to its identity. Since its origin, the EU has transformed from an economic 
community to a political union, consisting now of 27 member states and covering a broad range 
of policy areas. And although the extent (and desirability) of the Union‟s impact in an 
international context remain subject for discussion, academic and political observers alike seem to 
agree that the EU‟s significance should not be underestimated.2 It is evident that the EU is 
actively seeking to strengthen its role in international affairs. For example, giving the EU a 
stronger voice in the world was one of the top priorities of the previous Barroso Commission 
and expanding the zone of “…prosperity, stability and security” remains a core aim of the 
Union.3 This ambition is equally apparent in the Treaty of Lisbon. Through the establishment of 
two new posts – a permanent President of the European Council and a High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – the EU seeks to ensure consistency in its external actions by 
giving the Union a clearer voice in global affairs.4 But what does the EU want to obtain in its 
relations with other countries?   
 
Values such as democracy and human rights have long been important dimensions of the EU‟s 
internal identity. However, it was not until 1993 with the adoption of the Treaty of the European 
Union that they became part of its external policies.5 As of that point, the inclusion of a human 
rights clause was made mandatory in all trade and other agreements, meaning that (in theory at 
least) countries which conclude agreements with the Union are obliged to respect this principle.6 
The adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria (the accession criteria) in 1993 turned respect for 
                                                 
1
 Ashton, 2009 
2
 Not least is the EU considered to have been a crucial actor working for reform in the post communist states in 
Eastern Europe. See for example Dannreuther, 2006, p. 183ff. Bildt, 2010 and Schimmelfennig et al, 2005, p. 2ff.  
3
 Quote by Ferrero-Waldner, 2006.  p. 139. See also Cramér et al, 2007, p. 1 
4 EC, Treaty of Lisbon: The EU in the world. Apart from the symbolic importance of having clear representatives, 
one of the main motivations has been to ensure consistency in the Union‟s external action. The High Representative 
will also serve as Vice-President of the Commission. 
5 Wood, 2009, p. 117.  
6 Activities of the EU, Policy Areas: Human Rights.  
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certain values into an explicit condition for membership. According to the political criteria, 
countries wishing to join the EU must guarantee the respect for democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the rights of minorities.7 With the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 
December 2009, the EU sends yet more important signals about its devotion to these values – 
not least through the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The 
Charter declares the principles on which the Union is founded; indicating in this manner that the 
27 member states are in fact united on what values to prioritise and the importance of respecting 
them. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon makes the promotion of norms an explicit goal: 
“Promoting these values, as well as peace and the well-being of the Union‟s peoples are now the 
main objectives of the Union”.8  
 
It is obvious that the EU seeks to communicate norms and values as important dimensions of its 
identity and that the Union aims to ensure – and promote – its core values internally as well as 
externally. However, while undeniably sending an important symbolical message about the 
Union's priorities, political goals say little about how to attain and ensure their fulfilment. Political 
goals set the agenda but must be filled with substance and turned into actual policies in order to 
function in the day to day work.  According to previous research, civil servants play key roles in 
current political processes and much of the work to transform political goals into functional 
policies is carried out on „policy‟ rather than the „political‟ level. Much of the norm formulation 
can thus be claimed to occur in the internal policy-making process. This means that in order to 
understand the EU‟s role as a global actor and how it seeks to pursue values looking at the 
political goals solely is not enough: we need also consider the actual policy strategies and, more 
specifically, the motivations behind them.  
 
Since its origin, the EU has developed a number of foreign policies and policy instruments. 
According to academic and political observers alike, enlargement should be regarded the most 
successful foreign policy tool thus far, strengthening the Union‟s political weight and giving it a 
forum for spreading norms and values.9 As the feasibility of using enlargement as a means to 
international (or rather regional) influence is currently put into question, new policies building on 
the enlargement logic but lacking the membership perspective have been launched by the EU. 
Most notably the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been interpreted as an alternative 
                                                 
7 EC, Enlargement, Accession Criteria 
8 European Parliament, 2000 and EC, Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a Glance. Given that some theorists separate 
between norms and values, it should be pointed out that the two terms are used synonymously in this thesis. The 
main reason for doing so is that the interviewed officials made no distinction between them.  
9 See for example Schimmelfennig et al. 2005 
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means to increased influence and a forum for norm promotion in the neighbourhood. Yet, the 
ENP has been criticised for being too general, directed towards both the Southern and Eastern 
neighbourhood, and for failing to take the different expectations and ambitions of these various 
countries into account. Its potential value as a tool for norm promotion has additionally been 
questioned with reference to the perceived weakness of the incentives offered.10 When the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in late 2008, the intention was to improve the umbrella 
approach of the ENP by allowing for greater differentiation as well as to send a clear(er) political 
message of the EU‟s commitment to the Eastern neighbourhood. It is evident that the respect 
for EU-core values is a crucial dimension of both the ENP and the EaP but whereas the relation 
between the ENP and the EU‟s potential as a norm promoter has been quite thoroughly 
examined, the research about the EaP is scarce. 
 
The aim with this thesis is to contribute to the theoretical understanding of norm promotion in 
general and the EU‟s role as a norm promoter in particular. By focusing on the internal process 
of formulating the Eastern Partnership initiative, the purpose is to give a more multifaceted 
picture of how strategies for norm promotion are perceived by the norm promoter (represented 
by the officials) as well as to bridge the research gap about the policy as such.  
 
1.1 The EU as a Foreign Policy actor – what kind of policy? 
The EU‟s tendency to focus on values in its relations with other countries has caused some 
observers to argue for an understanding and conceptualisation of the EU as a “normative” or 
“civilian” power. The Union is said to represent something qualitatively new in international 
relations, acting as a changer of norms rather than trying to gain impact through „traditional‟ (hard) 
power means. According to this line of reasoning, the external actions of the EU are value driven 
rather than interest driven and the normative goals are pursued through normative means.11 Not 
all agree with the conceptualisation of the EU as a normative actor, however. While not 
questioning the existence of value promotion in EU external policies, the realist critique has 
pointed out that the EU is essentially made up of rational states. Because they are rational in the 
sense that they try to maximise their interests based on the information at hand, the promotion 
of values should be seen as yet another means to obtain certain (often material) goals.12 
                                                 
10 Kochenov, 2009, p. 7ff 
11 Manners, 2002, p. 252f. See also Sjursén 2006.  
12 Hyde Price, 2006, p. 226ff. For example, improving the image of the Union/its member states could in turn 
increase its chances of attaining other (material) goals. Furthermore, as it is generally assumed that agents have an 
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Leaving the objective accuracy of these analyses behind, the question that springs to mind is 
whether or not this makes any difference – or, rather, if the European Union makes a difference. 
The significance of the European Union‟s external actions in general and its devotion to norms in 
particular has been questioned with reference to the fact that most foreign and security policy 
matters remain subject for member state competence. This vouches for a weaker role for the EU 
as a foreign policy actor, limiting its freedom for manoeuvre. The EU‟s lack of a common foreign 
policy worth its name is frequently pointed out in academic research as well as mainstream media. 
Yet, most agree that from a regional – or perhaps rather Eastern – point of view the EU is an 
actor of crucial importance. Enlargement is often described as the EU's most successful foreign 
policy tool thus far, giving the Union a forum for and instruments to influence potential member 
states. By letting the prospect of membership serve as an incentive for non members to reform 
and adopt EU norms and standards, the EU has contributed to the stabilisation of these 
countries and been able to spread its core norms. Thus, the accession procedures are considered 
to have allowed the EU (irrespective of its motives) to become a successful value promoter. 13  
 
When the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004 it was accompanied by a 
growing sense that the EU should be precautious of relying too much on enlargement as a 
foreign policy strategy because, as formulated by the former European Commissioner for 
external relations and the ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner “… it is clear that the EU cannot enlarge 
ad infinitum”.14 Despite the fact that the desire to join the Union remains strong, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that further enlargements are at least currently off the EU-agenda.15 The ENP 
as well as the Eastern Partnership, have been interpreted as possible solutions to the challenge of 
finding new ways for EU engagement and norm promotion in the region.16 The policies appear 
to follow the enlargement-logic establishing a framework for cooperation and offering the 
neighbours incentives (commonly phrased as a stake into the internal market) in return for 
reforms and adherence to EU norms and values.17 Political association and economic integration 
are of course attractive benefits, but the absence of the EU‟s most powerful incentive yet 
                                                                                                                                                        
interest in stability in their external environment promoting peace and democracy could be interpreted as a general 
goal per se. p. 222 
13 See for example Haukkala, 2008, Dannreuther, 2006, Hettne et al, 2005. See also EC, The rationale for 
enlargement. 
14 Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, p. 139 
15 One indication of this is that the EU describes its „absorption capacity‟ as an issue to be considered in future 
enlargement discussions, see Activities of the EU, Policy Areas: Enlargement:. Yet, it is likely that the already started 
membership negotiations with Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey will be  
continued. See for example Haukkala, 2008, p. 1602, 1611ff  
16 Haukkala, 2008, p. 1602. Michalski, 2009, p. 2. 
17 Haukkala, 2009, p. 5. Admittedly, the Commission refers to “shared values” as the foundation for cooperation in 
the ENP and EaP documents. Yet, as the questions of what values that are to be respected has not been subject for 
negotiations the practical implication of these formulations can be questioned.  
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(membership of the Union) has caused some observers to question the potential efficiency of the 
ENP and EaP as means to EU influence alternative to that of enlargement.18 Although this 
critique is in itself problematic – it builds on the rationalist assumption that the neighbours are 
just interested in the incentives offered, rather than the norms and/or reform processes as such, 
and it presumes that promoting norms is the goal that the EU wants to obtain – it raises the 
question of how the Union perceives its potential of being a successful norm promoter when 
lacking the membership-incentive. Is offering incentives regarded the sole strategy for promoting 
values? 
 
1.2 Defining the problem 
As outlined above, academic research as well as official EU documents indicate that the EU 
wants to be perceived as a Union built on values (as opposed to military power) and as a “force 
for good” in international relations. It is furthermore evident that the EU seeks to promote its 
core principles (human rights, democracy etc.) by including them in trade and cooperation 
agreements and by establishing them as conditions for EU-membership. But what are the actual 
strategies for spreading values? The question of how and why norms are promoted and the 
empirical effects of different strategies have been addressed by a number of scholars, 
emphasising both the importance of external incentives and processes of socialisation and social 
learning.19 Less attention, however, has been directed towards how norm promotion and the 
relevance of different strategies are conceived by the norm promoter itself. More specifically, previous 
research has failed to take into account the conceptions held by civil servants and how norm 
promotion is understood in the internal process of policy-making. I argue that there are two 
reasons why this lack is problematic: First, institutions do not talk. This means that we cannot 
investigate how the EU perceives its role as a norm promoter without talking to the people who 
make up and represent the institution. Second, although political leaders are the most apparent 
representatives they are by no means the only ones involved in realising political goals. Rather, 
this responsibility is shared with the officials assigned to contribute expertise concerning how 
visionary goals can be converted into functional policies.20 By leaving the preparatory phase aside 
and merely investigating the policies or talking to the political leaders, one runs the risk of 
missing important dimensions of why certain strategies are preferred above others. The aim of 
the thesis at hand is to bridge this gap by examining how strategies for norm promotion are 
                                                 
18 Haukkala, 2008, p. 1602, Michalski, 2009, p. 2. 
19 See for example Schimmelfennig et al. 2005 
20
 In accordance with the academic literature on the role played by bureaucracy in political processes, I use the terms 
“officials”, “bureaucrats” and “civil servants” synonymously. 
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conceived in the internal process of policy-making by adding the perspective of the civil servants. 
In order to do so I focus on the process of developing the Eastern Partnership, the European 
Union‟s newest framework for managing EU-Eastern neighbourhood relations. The EaP is a 
suitable case for two reasons: According to the European Commission (EC), the EaP  
 
…should bring a lasting political message of EU solidarity, alongside additional, tangible support for 
their democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation of their statehood and territorial 
integrity. (…) The  EaP will be based on mutual commitments to the rule of law, good governance, 
respect for human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and the principles of the market 
economy and sustainable development.21 
 
This means that promoting values is an important dimension of the initiative. Moreover the 
research about the Partnership in general and its relation to the EU‟s norm promotion-ambitions 
in particular is much limited. I therefore argue that the Eastern Partnership is fitting both as a 
“case” of a policy-making process in which norm promotion can be expected to have played an 
important role and as a unique object for analysis.   
 
The overarching question is thus: how is the issue of norm promotion and strategies for becoming a successful 
norm promoter conceived in the internal policy-making process of the EU?   
 
1.2.1 Elaborating the argument 
The academic literature indicate that there are good reasons for directing attention to the civil 
servants assigned to put political goals into practice when trying to understand a political process 
and outcome. Because of a significant increase of power delegation from the political to the 
administrative level, politicians are no longer the only ones involved in policy-making.22 Some 
claim that this tendency is even more evident in the EU context given that the greater degree of 
depoliticisation of (at least some) political issues augments the need for expertise which, in turn, 
increases the bureaucrats‟ source of influence.23 This renders examining conceptions held by civil 
servants highly motivated: not only do they own information that few other actors have access to 
but they are also in a position to influence the policy setups. I therefore argue that studying the 
preparatory work of the Eastern Partnership enables a more multifaceted picture of norm 
promotion in general and the EU as a norm promoter in Eastern Europe in particular than what 
would have been made possible by solely examining the EaP-policy and/or political declarations. 
                                                 
21 European Commission, 2008, pp. 2-3 
22 This argument will be elaborated in chapter 3. For an introduction to the subject, see for example Aberbach et al. 
1981 
23 Beyers et al, 2004, p. 1120 and Tallberg, 2002, p. 23 
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It should be pointed out, however, that although the officials‟ conceptions are the main object of 
analysis, it is not the civil servants themselves who are of primarily interest. Rather, it is their role 
as representatives of the EU as an institution that makes them relevant: they can tell us something 
about how strategies for value promotion are conceived within the EU system as a whole.  
 
Examining the internal process of policy-making is relevant from a theoretical as well as empirical 
point of view. First, in contexts where previous experiences exist, policy-makers can be expected 
to express insights about which strategies that are considered successful. By focusing on goals 
and outcomes without taking the process into account, previous research has failed to 
acknowledge the fact that the conceptions (often based on previous experiences) held by the civil 
servants form the foundation and dictate the conditions for the policies launched.24 
Consequently, I argue that these perceptions should be taken into account irrespective of their 
objective truth. Second, it can be expected that an examination of the process rather than just the 
declared goals and/or the concrete policy can increase our understanding of the dynamics 
between intentions and restrictions. This, in turn, improves the possibility of giving a multi 
faceted picture of the EaP by casting light on what is sought for politically (the goals) and what 
has been possible in terms of policy. It might well be that certain goals are considered utterly 
important but turn out impossible to realise due to lack of resources and/or trade-offs between 
conflicting goals. Put differently, focusing on the process rather than the goals solely, we allow 
for both intentions and restrictions to be taken into consideration.  
 
Third, I argue that there are potentially new empirical insights about the EU in general and its 
role as a norm promoter in particular to be gained. Admittedly, as Sjursén points out, reaching 
“....to the „hearts and souls‟ of policy makers” in order to discover the „true‟ motives is hardly 
doable.25 However, by investigating the hands-on policy level and illuminating the (perceived) 
degree of devotion directed towards norm promotion we can learn more about the extent to 
which this goal is prioritised and actively pursued within the EU-system. Furthermore, by 
studying how conflicts between different (normative as opposed to „traditional‟) goals are handled 
we can elaborate our understanding of the ambivalence that is sometimes claimed to characterise 
the EU's external actions. The point is that the degree of significance ascribed to the EU's 
                                                 
24 See for example Rothstein, 2001, p. 15  
25 Sjursén, 2002, p. 496 
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normative goals internally tells us something about how important norm promotion is to the EU 
in general. 26  
 
Since there are no theoretically grounded assumptions of how civil servants can be expected to 
reason regarding the issues at hand to guide the framework for analysis, I employ existing general 
theories about norm promotion/compliance as point of departure. By developing a theoretical 
model for norm promotion strategies and applying this to the interview data, the intention is to 
contribute to the theoretical as well as empirical understanding of strategies for norm promotion.  
 
1.3 Defining the aim of the thesis 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to increase the theoretical and empirical understanding of 
norm promotion in general and the EU‟s foreign policy goal of spreading values in particular. 
Building on existing theories about norm compliance and focusing on the internal process of policy-
making, I seek to bridge what seems to be a gap in previous research. In order to do so, I focus on 
the policy-making process of the Eastern Partnership, interviewing civil servants involved in the 
policy preparations. How do they reason about strategies for norm promotion and what 
assumptions about the motives for adopting new norms seem to have guided the policy choices? 
The purpose of this thesis is thus twofold: on a theoretical level I want to contribute to the theories 
about norm promotion/compliance by shifting focus from the target to promoter, adding the 
perspective of the people involved in the internal process of policy-making. On an empirical level, 
the aim is to increase the knowledge of the EaP and its relation to the EU‟s general foreign policy 
ambition to spread values. Needless to say, although this thesis focuses on the case of the EaP, 
the ambition is nevertheless to draw conclusions contributing to the understanding of norm 
promotion and the EU as a norm promoter in general.  
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the policy-making process is not the subject for analysis in 
itself, but rather serves as an instrument to gain a more multifaceted picture of the EU‟s (in its 
capacity as a norm promoter) understanding of norm promotion.  
 
                                                 
26 Several analyses within the field of Europan Studies which discusses the EU‟s identity point at the value dimension 
as an important constitutive part. See for example Barbé et al, 2008 and Sjursén, 2008. 
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1.4 Defining the specific research questions 
In order to fulfil the theoretical and empirical aims outlined above, this thesis addresses the 
following specific research questions:  
-How do the civil servants involved in the preparatory work of the EaP understand the intentions 
behind and objectives of the Eastern Partnership?  
-How are strategies for norm promotion conceived in the internal policy-making process?  
-Can the way the civil servants reason about norm promotion be understood in terms of the 
social learning and the external incentives models respectively? Are there aspects that the 
theoretical model presented in chapter 3.3 does not take into account?   
 
The relevance of and intentions behind these questions will be further elaborated below. 
 
1.5 Disposition 
Chapter one introduced the area of interest and defined the problem and purpose at hand.  
However, before addressing the specific research questions, a more thorough exposition of the 
empirical as well as theoretical context is called for. Thus, chapter two lays down the empirical 
context by describing the EU‟s freedom for manoeuvre in foreign affairs, discussing the 
background and development of the EaP. In chapter three the theoretical framework is developed. 
The argument for focusing on the internal process of policy-making is elaborated, as is the 
concept of norms in international relations. I then direct my attention to the theories about norm 
promotion/compliance that form the foundation for the interview guide. The last section 
presents the theoretical model used in the forthcoming analysis.  
 
Chapter four moves the study from the general to the specific by accounting for some 
methodological considerations as well as discussing the relevance and limitations of the study. 
Chapter five examines the content and setup of the Eastern Partnership and together with the 
theoretical framework serves as point of departure for the interviews. Chapter six presents and 
analyses the interview-result by linking it to the key concepts of the theoretical model presented 
in chapter three. In the last section, the theoretical model is evaluated and a figure illustrating 
how the officials conceive the ideal strategy for norm promotion developed. Finally, the last 
chapter summarises the conclusions drawn and discusses the significance and implications of the 
analysis.  
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2. Empirical context: the European Union in international affairs  
 
Few would oppose that the European Union is an actor that needs to be taken into account in 
any analysis of current international relations. As the world‟s biggest trader with trade- and 
partnership agreements that cover almost all regions of the planet, the EU is indisputably 
important in economic terms.27 The EU‟s political weight, however, remains controversial. Aiming 
to provide the reader with a general understanding of the empirical context in which the EaP has 
been initiated and developed, this chapter gives an overview of the particularities of EU foreign 
policy. In the first part the opportunities and restrictions for the EU as a foreign policy actor are 
discussed. The second part considers the evolution and significance of two foreign policies of 
particular importance for the Eastern Partnership – enlargement and the ENP – and introduces 
the background of the Eastern Partnership. The official EaP-documents are examined in chapter 
five.    
 
2.1. Setting the frame: possibilities and restrictions for the EU as a foreign 
policy actor 
Any examination of the EU‟s role in international affairs must inevitably consider the internal 
relationship between the powers of the EU-institutions on the one hand and the member states 
on the other. In doing so there are particularly two dimensions that merit attention: whether a 
given policy sector is a community (EU) issue or not, and what principle for decision making that 
is applied. To a great extent, these two aspects determine the freedom for the EU as an 
independent actor by defining its room for manoeuvre. The first dimension concerns the EU‟s 
possibility to act at all, ranging from far-reaching within sectors subject for community 
competence to very limited in sectors were member state competence prevails.28 The second 
dimension is important as it illuminates both the degree of integration and how efficiently 
decisions can be expected to be made.  
 
The idea of the European Union as one actor with the ability to pursue coherent policies is 
sometimes questioned with reference to its intergovernmental features – after all, the organisation 
is made up of 27 sovereign states and unanimity is still required in many policy sectors. However, 
since its origin in the 1950‟s the EU has transformed from being an economic community to 
                                                 
27 Nugent, 2006, p. 485 and Activities of the European Union, Policy areas: External Relations.  
28 Nugent, 2006, p. 355, pp. 39-40. It should be noted, however, that today there are few policy areas in which the 
EU is not at all involved. 
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becoming a political Union. The widening and deepening of the cooperation has been 
accompanied by a continuous strengthening of the supranational features in the Union‟s setup 
and functioning. In other words, the EU should not – cannot – today be categorised as an 
intergovernmental organisation. I argue that there are a number of aspects that makes it plausible 
to talk about an EU-agenda (analytically) separable from the member states‟: First, the variation 
between the institutions‟ assignment principles, decision making and work procedures make the 
pursuit of a coherent national strategy complicated. Solely in the Council of Ministers can the 
member states count on their representatives to work for the “national interests”. In the 
European Parliament (EP) the dividing lines tend to follow political affiliation rather than 
national belonging and the Commissioners staffing the European Commission are expected to be 
neutral. Although admittedly appointed by the member states, the Commissioners represent the 
EU rather than their national governments and work for the fulfilment of the Commission‟s 
explicit task to be a “...promoter of the general interest”.29 Thus, it seems reasonable to regard the 
Commission as the most important source to and driver of the EU-agenda.  
 
Second, with the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the supranational features of the EU have 
been additionally strengthened, especially as regards the procedures for decision-making. The 
intergovernmental demand for unity has been replaced by qualified majority (QMV) as voting 
principle in most policy sectors and the EP‟s impact in the decision making has been expanded 
through increased use of the co-decision-procedure.30 Furthermore, as the Treaty abolishes the 
pillar structure and grants the Union one single legal personality, it has now gained the capacity to 
conclude international agreements and to join international organisations.31 According to the EU, 
this change together with the establishment of two new posts will enable the Union to be more 
efficient and visible on the international stage.32 A permanent President of the European Council 
has been appointed with the aim to decrease previous confusion caused by the principle of a 
rotating presidency. And in an attempt to further ensure the effectiveness and consistency of its 
external actions, a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who will also 
serve as Vice-President of the Commission) has been selected to represent the EU in foreign 
                                                 
29 Nugent, 2006, p. 166 How likely it is that the Commissioners do in fact manage to shield themselves from all 
forms of national influence can of course be questioned.     
30 Nugent, 2006, p. 155, 558ff. The EP‟s influence in the decision making under the previously used procedures of 
”assent” and “consultation” was much limited. Co-decision, however, means that the law making power is equally 
shared between the Council and the EP.  For more information, see Decision making in the EU 
31 The essence of the structure is however kept, allowing for intergovernmental as well as supranational modes of 
decision making. 
32 EC, Treaty of Lisbon: The EU in the world. 
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policy related matters.33 Returning to the words of the newly appointed High Representative 
Catherine Ashton that began this thesis, it seems like the possibility for the EU to act as the 
global actor it aims to be has been strengthened. In extension, it might even mean that Henry 
Kissinger‟s famous question about who to call when wanting to talk to Europe has been given an 
answer.  
 
2.1.1 From weak to important? The evolution of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy  
According to Nugent there are four policy sectors connected to the EU‟s external relations, 
namely foreign, security and defence; trade; development and; the external dimension of internal 
policies. The EU‟s role within the different sectors varies according to the logic described above; 
ranging from strong in trade related issues (because the EU has competence to conduct 
economic relations) to much more limited within the field of foreign, security and defence 
policy.34 The Eastern Partnership falls under the umbrella policy of the ENP which, in turn, fall 
under the scope of the EU‟s general external relations. This infers that, similarly to enlargement, 
the ENP and EaP include issues related to all of the policy sectors just mentioned. So why does 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) merit extra attention? The CFSP sets out a 
number of ambitious objectives, ranging from strengthening the international security to 
developing the respect for human rights. As will be elaborated below, however, the overall 
intergovernmental character of the CFSP means that the EU‟s ability to work for their fulfilment 
has been (and continues to be) much limited.35 Instead, previous research indicate that the EU 
has been most successful in its attempts to do so through enlargement and, albeit to a lesser 
exten, the ENP.36 So, while acknowledging that neither enlargement nor the ENP are formally part 
of the CFSP, I claim that considering the slow evolution and the continuous limitations of the 
CFSP helps to illuminate the significance of these policies and, in extension, the need for the 
EaP.  
 
With the outburst of the war in Yugoslavia and its drawn-out aftermath, it became painfully 
evident that the EU lacked the tools (and, some would claim, the political ambition) to act as the 
global power it aspires to be. The EU‟s attempts to broker a political solution to the crisis turned 
                                                 
33 EC, Treaty of Lisbon: The EU in the world. Herman van Rompuy has been appointed President of the Council 
and Catherine Ashton High Representative for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, Ashton is to be assisted by a new 
European External Action Service. 
34 Nugent, 2006, p. 483ff, Cramér et al, 2007, p. 1ff 
35 Nugent, 2006, p. 501 
36 See for example Dannreuther, 2006, and Nowak et al. 2007, p. 66ff  
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out unsuccessful and, as the Union did not have a military force of its own, the member states 
were directed to intervene only as part of the UN or NATO forces.37 
 
The EU‟s inability to play a constructive role during and after the Balkan wars is frequently taken 
as point of departure in academic as well as political discussions about the prospect for EU 
leadership in international affairs. The high-toned rhetoric about becoming a “…leading global 
actor” is considered unrealistic as long as the EU does not develop a Common foreign and security 
policy worth its name.38 Admittedly, although some foreign policy cooperation did in fact occur 
during the 1970‟s and 1980‟s, it was not until 1992 with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty 
that the CFSP was launched. Specifying that the EU and its member states “‟...shall define and 
implement a common foreign and security policy‟” it provided for systematic cooperation on all 
foreign and security matters of general interest.39 Albeit an important change, its potential impact 
was held back by the fact that the policy remained intergovernmental in character, requiring unity 
for any decision to be made. With the Treaty of Amsterdam entering into force in 1999, however, 
the decision-making was made somewhat more efficient through the introduction of a 
“constructive abstention” device (allowing states to abstain from applying a decision while letting 
the others continue the integration-process) and the provision for QMV in matters regarding two 
of the existing five policy instruments.40 
 
Although the essentially intergovernmental character of the decision-making is maintained also 
with the Lisbon Treaty in place, particularly two changes can be expected to affect the EU‟s role 
as a foreign policy actor. Whitman et al emphasise the importance of the establishment of a High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. According to them, the High 
Representative can be interpreted as a 
 
...personification, and the animus of the new gathering together of all aspects of external action, 
formally responsible for its consistency across the Treaties and institutions...and clearly key to 
achieving the ambition of greater synergy across all aspects of external action.41 
 
Furthermore, the granting of a legal personality to the Union enables it to sign treaties and 
international agreements – if only in those areas where competences have been conferred from 
the member state to EU-level.42  
                                                 
37Nugent, 2006, p. 495 and EC, External relations, Working for a safer world.  
38 Cramér et al, 2007, pp. 1-2 
39 Nugent, 2006, p. 91 
40 Nugent, 2006, pp. 91-98, pp. 495-501. The five policy instruments are: Principles and guidelines from the 
European Council, common strategies, joint actions, common positions and information and consultation. 
41 Whitman et al. 2009, p. 32. For information about the specific changes see Whitman et al, 2009, p. 28ff 
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Making use of the two dimensions introduced in section 2.1. it is evident that the EU‟s impact 
over CFSP-related matters has been significantly strengthened in recent years. The member states 
do in fact coordinate their foreign policies, decisions can (although this is rarely done) be made by 
QMV and the CFSP is legally binding in the member states. As Smith points out, the 
institutionalisation of EU foreign policy since 1970 makes it difficult for the member states to 
shape their foreign policies without at least some reference to EU activities.43 Yet, it is equally 
evident that the member states have been reluctant to this transfer of power, resulting in a much 
slower process of integration than what has marked many other policy sectors. Given the nature 
of foreign and security policy perhaps this should come as no surprise – after all, foreign policy is 
intimately linked to the idea of national sovereignty. Making it subject to community competence 
would not only implicate limitations in the freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy; it 
would furthermore be conceived as a compromise with the national sovereignty.44 All in all, 
however, the member states have in fact judged the benefits of increased cooperation to be 
stronger than the disadvantages. There has been a gradual transfer of power from member state 
to the EU-level and prerequisites for increased EU-impact in global affairs have been improved.  
 
Returning to the Union‟s inability to handle the Balkan wars constructively, the picture almost 
twenty years later is somewhat different. When war broke out between Russia and Georgia 
regarding the status of the break-away regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, the EU made 
it clear that it had no intentions of accepting another foreign policy failure. Consequently, the 
Union established itself as the “…main diplomatic broker” and has continued its efforts to play a 
central role on the ground.45 Although the final outcome of this remains yet to be seen, it is 
evident that the EU‟s role as an actor in international relations has been significantly strengthened 
also from an empirical point of view. This is not least true from a regional perspective – a fact that 
has been particularly well illustrated by the enlargement experiences. This is the issue to which we 
now turn.  
2.2 Background of the Eastern Partnership  
Apart from being important for the EU‟s role as a foreign policy actor in general, enlargement 
and the ENP are important backgrounds to the newly initiated Eastern Partnership. Thus, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 Dagand, 2008, p. 3  
43 E Smith, 2002, pp. 743-746 
44 Nugent, 2006, p. 1ff 
45 Popescu et al, 2008, p. 1  
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order to understand the motivations behind the EaP we need first consider these two policy 
areas.46  
 
2.2.1 Enlargement – a key foreign policy of the EU  
Enlargement is generally perceived as a crucial dimension of the EU‟s foreign policy and as the 
context in which the Union has been most successful in its ambitions to promote norms. Since 
its foundation the EU has enlarged a number of times; from the first round in 1973 (when 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were granted membership) to the most recent in 
2007 (with Bulgaria and Romania joining). Yet, despite these continuous enlargements, seemingly 
it was not until the beginning of the 1990‟s that enlargement was explicitly emphasised as a 
means or even tool to expand the EU‟s influence in international relations. Admittedly, 
preventing Greece from falling back to authoritarian rule has been described as one important 
motivation for granting it membership of the Union in 1981, but the gravitational power of the 
EU is generally discussed with reference to the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements.47 
 
The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in great political changes throughout the continent; the post 
Communist states of Eastern Europe going through transition and turning “back” to Europe. 
There is widespread agreement among academic as well as political observers that the EU played 
a key role in these reform processes and that the political accession conditionality was a crucial 
aspect. The fact that many of the formerly communist states applied for membership of the 
Union meant that the EU gained a forum for influencing their internal development. Presented 
with the offer of EU-membership (and the benefits associated with it) the non members were 
encouraged to carry out rapid reform processes. Membership was thus offered in return for 
adherence to and adoption of EU norms and standards.48 Dannreuther comes to the conclusion 
that the significance of enlargement for the EU‟s potential as a global actor cannot be 
underestimated. He describes the 2004 and 2007 enlargements as key success stories for the EU 
giving “...greater credibility to the EU‟s ambitions to be treated as a global actor in world 
politics”.49 Apart from increasing the number of member states, population and size of the 
economy, enlargement has resulted in greater political weight for the Union and has for this reason 
                                                 
46 Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been pictured as an additional forum for norm promotion. 
Due to its lack of relation with the EaP as well as practical limitations this regional strategy will however not be 
considered here.  
47 See for example Schimmelfennig et al, 2005 and Dannreuther, 2006, p. 188ff. The importance of the enlargements 
following the fall of the Berlin wall is similarly underlined by the former Commissioner for External Relations and 
ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. See Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, p. 139  
48 Haukkala, 2008, p. 1603 and Schimmelfennig et al. 2005 
49 Dannreuther, 2006, p. 184. Schimmelfennig et al. 2005 gives a similar picture as does Cremona et al. 2007.  
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been pictured as the context in which the EU has been most successful in its attempts to spread 
its core values. As pointed out by Haukkala  
 
…the enlargement process acts as a conduit through which the EU as a normative power Eu-
rope…can project its norms and values in a way that is both efficient and legitimate. (…) The key 
here is to appreciate the fact that EU enlargement is not only about drawing geographical boundaries; 
it is also about establishing, or imposing, an EU order in Europe through the transference and diffu-
sion of EU norms, values, rules and regulations.50 
 
Moreover, the very success of enlargement strengthened the EU‟s claim to possess a capacity to 
influence the internal development of other states using moral persuasion rather than military 
power. 51 The conclusion to be drawn is thus that through enlargement the EU has managed to 
expand in territorial as well as political terms; establishing itself as a powerful foreign policy actor 
and giving greater impetus to the (at least self-pursued) understanding of the EU as an actor 
founded on norms and values rather than military means. Finally, it can be noted that the EU 
seems to be aware – and wishes to make use of – the double function of enlargement as a foreign 
policy tool. In the words of the former Commissionaire Benita Ferrero-Waldner:  
 
The EU‟s aim is to expand the zone of prosperity, stability and security beyond our borders. The 
question is how to use our soft power to leverage the kinds of reforms that would make that possible. 
The answer…was Enlargement. This has been a tremendously successful policy (…) EU enlargement 
has made an extraordinary contribution to peace and prosperity, thanks to our strategic use of the 
incentives on offer.52 
 
2.2.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy  
The 2004 enlargement did not merely result in a ten countries larger EU and a significant increase 
of its sphere of influence; it also created a whole new neighbourhood for the Union. It is evident 
that this change cast new light on how the EU perceives its relations with the formerly very dis-
tant (in geographical as well as political terms) but soon to be close countries. According to the 
Commission, the accession of the ten new member states made enhancing the EU-Eastern 
neighbourhood relations more urgent.  Yet, how this was to be done, what was the ideal nature of 
this enhancement was not evident. Already existing forms of cooperation (the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements, (PCAs), and the Association Agreements) were considered inadequate 
and, due to so called “enlargement fatigue” and growing (popular and political) opposition, con-
tinuing to enlarge was not perceived a feasible option. The European Neighbourhood Policy was 
                                                 
50 Haukkala, 2008, p. 1604 
51 Dannreuther, 2006, p. 184 and Tocci 2007, p. 24  
52 Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, p. 139 
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presented as a solution to this challenge, supplementing the PCAs and Association Agreements 
and establishing a framework for strengthening the EU‟s relations with those neighbouring coun-
tries that do not have the perspective of membership of the Union.53 While admittedly not solv-
ing the basic dilemma of enlargement (the ENP neither provides for nor rule out a membership 
perspective) the ENP provided the EU with additional tools to foster friendly neighbourhoods.54 
With the often quoted creating “…a „ring of friends‟” as its overarching purpose, the ENP builds 
on the (good) experiences from enlargement, offering the neighbour countries incentives in re-
turn for reforms and adherence to EU norms:  
 
In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, 
economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU‟s 
neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.55 
 
But why was increased engagement in the Eastern neighbourhood called for? Naturally, one 
explanation is the political implications stemming from the 2004 enlargement: it is evident that 
the EU felt that the increased nearness of the less stable countries of Eastern Europe might 
threaten the EU‟s internal security. Improved relations were thus motivated from a geopolitical 
point of view.56 Yet, it is equally reasonable to interpret the purpose of the ENP in more idealis-
tic terms. The ENP-documents and webpage all stress the commitment to shared values in addi-
tion to the ambition to promote security and it is explicitly stated that the cooperation‟s level of 
ambition depends on the extent to which the shared values are in fact shared.57 For this reason, 
the ENP has been interpreted as the most promising new forum and/or instrument for the EU 
to promote norms. As Tocci notes, the ENP has put “…greater and more explicit emphasis on 
democracy and human rights compared to previous initiatives towards the neighbouring south 
and east”.58 Has the EU been successful in its attempts to promote values outside the context of 
enlargement? The academic research point in two directions. On the one hand it is claimed that 
previous experiences suggest that the EU‟s potential as a norm promoter is intimately linked to 
the incentive of (full) membership.59 On the other hand, McDonagh‟s empirical study of interna-
tional organisations‟ efforts to promote democracy in Moldova shows that although the prospect 
                                                 
53 Haukkala, 2008, Cremona et al. 2007. European Commission, 2003 
54 Smith, 2005, p. 757. In its ENP-communication the Commissions states that the aim with the neighbourhood 
policy is to provide a framework for the “…development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-
term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union‟s institutions”. European Commission, 2003, p. 5 
55 European Commission, 2003, p. 4. For more information about the incentives offered, see p. 10ff 
56 This is not least illustrated by the launch and content of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2004, stating that 
“...integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas”. The Council 
of the European Union, 2003, p. 8 
57 European Commission, 2003 and EC, External Relations, European Neighbourhood Policy. 
58 Tocci 2007, p. 24 See also Cremona et al. 2007.  
59 Haukkala, 2008, p. 1604 
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of membership is a very powerful incentive it is by no means the only effective tool.60 This leads 
to the conclusion that although the absence of the membership perspective challenges the po-
tential efficiency of EU-policies, it should not in itself be regarded a hindrance to successful 
value promotion. While recognising the advantages of offering incentives, the European Com-
mission appears hopeful about the potential of strengthened cooperation as an instrument for 
increased influence, arguing that “…enhanced interdependence – both political and economic – 
can itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable development both within and 
without the EU”.61 The question is, however, if the absence of powerful incentives should be 
understood as the result of a conscious choice or an inability or even reluctance to make the nec-
essary concessions. This is one of the issues that will be explored in the examination of how the 
civil servants involved in EU foreign policy-making conceive strategies for norm promotion.  
 
2.3 The process of developing the Eastern Partnership  
The EU‟s approach towards its Eastern Neighbourhood post-enlargement can be characterised 
as a work in progress that, according to some observers, has been marked by uncertainty and the 
member states‟ diverging interests in the region.62 It should perhaps therefore come as no sur-
prise that when Poland first suggested a specific “Eastern Dimension” of EU Foreign Policy in 
the end of the 1990‟s it did not gain much support from either the Commission or the other 
member states. Certainly, most agreed that the upcoming 2004 enlargement would cast new light 
on EU-neighbourhood relations but since the Mediterranean states insisted that any new policy 
would have to include the Southern countries as well, the idea of an Eastern dimension was put 
on ice for the benefit of the more general ENP directed towards the East and South. It was not 
until 2007 with the French president Sarkozy‟s continuous efforts to establish a “Mediterranean 
Union” for the Southern EU-members and their neighbours, that an Eastern initiative became 
viable. The French proposition provoked great opposition from within the Union – eventually 
forcing Sarkozy to compromise and make do with a “Union for the Mediterranean” consisting 
of all EU member states and most of the Southern neighbours – but it also encouraged other 
member states to consider a similar policy with Eastern Europe.63 
 
Consequently, when Sweden and Poland made a joint proposal in the European Council in May 
2008, suggesting an Eastern Partnership with the purpose to reinforce EU-Eastern 
                                                 
60 McDonagh, 2008, pp. 158-159 
61 European Commission, 2003, p. 4. Emphasis added.  
62 Haukkala, 2009, p. 2 
63 Hillion et al. 2009, p. 5, Haukkala, 2009, p. 5 
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neighbourhood relations, the other member states were probably more susceptible than they had 
previously been. It was widely agreed that the already existing ENP was insufficiently tailored to 
meet the realities of the Eastern neighbourhood and, what is more, that it did not recognise their 
different aspirations towards the EU. The purpose of the Polish-Swedish initiative was to 
complement and enhance the ENP by providing a specific framework for cooperation with the 
Eastern neighbours of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Michalski 
describes the proposal as a deliberate attempt by Sweden and Poland to strengthen the Eastern 
non-EU members‟ position vis-à-vis other countries “…in the competition for the attention of 
the Brussels bureaucracy, the Union‟s financial resources and political support”.64 Moreover, she 
claims that the “thinly veiled” ambition to “…create an antechamber for those Eastern countries 
which had clearly stated their aspiration to join the EU (…) but to whom the EU was becoming 
increasingly reluctant to accord membership perspectives” was yet another important motivator.65 
Growing opposition to further enlargements made any efforts to actively promote full 
membership unrealistic and the Eastern Partnership could serve as an alternative means to 
support the modernisation of the Eastern Neighbours and in this manner facilitate future EU-
integration. Concurrently, the times was deemed favourable because of the presidency schedule: 
the upcoming presidencies of the Czech Republic, Sweden and Poland – all proponents of 
strengthened relations with Eastern Europe – could be expected to support and carry the process 
forward.66 
 
Albeit initially supported by the other member states, the initiative soon became subject of a 
number of criticisms. It was pointed out that the EaP would overlap with other frameworks for 
regional cooperation in Eastern Europe (the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the EU‟s 
Black Sea Synergy) and that it risked diluting existing policy processes such as the ENP. The 
initiative was additionally criticised for the risk of cementing the regionalisation-tendency of EU 
foreign policies as well as for competing with other regional partners for the EU‟s already scarce 
resources. However, with war breaking out between Georgia and Russia in autumn 2008, the 
situation was altered. The war illuminated the vulnerable position of the Eastern neighbours, 
lying between Russia and the EU and, as Michalski notes, made clear that the “…former CIS 
republics (…) were in fact essential to EU‟s foreign policy aims of stability and prosperity in the 
neighbourhood”.67 This meant that the calls for enhancing the EU-Eastern neighbourhood 
relations were given new impetus. And, as the one-size-fits-all-logic underpinning the ENP was 
                                                 
64 Michalski, 2009, p. 2. Se also Hillion et al. 2009, p. 4ff 
65 Michalski, 2009, pp. 1-2 (quote from p. 2) 
66 Michalski, 2009, p. 2 
67 Michalski, 2009, p. 2 
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considered making it an inadequate response to this challenge, the idea of an Eastern Partnership 
was rendered highly relevant.  
 
The Georgia-Russia conflict underlined the importance of EU presence as such and the urgency 
of enhancing EU-Eastern neighbourhood relations. It should nevertheless be pointed out that 
though the conflict speeded up the process of developing and adopting the Eastern Partnership, 
it was not the causal factor. The European Council of 19-20th June 2008 had invited the 
European Commission to prepare a proposal for a new policy directed towards the Eastern 
Neighbourhood to be presented in spring 2009. The Extraordinary European Council of 1st 
September 2008 “…asked for this work to be accelerated, responding to the need for a clearer 
signal of EU commitment following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions”.68 
Hence, when the Commission presented its communication in December 2008 it did so three 
months earlier than initially anticipated. After having been discussed and negotiated among the 
EU-member states, the Eastern Partnership was finally officially launched and adopted by all EU 
member states in May 2009.69 Since then, the work to implement the Partnership has commenced 
and a so called Task Force Eastern Partnership assigned to coordinate and monitor this process 
has been established. By initiating a completely new section the Commission wants to signalise 
the “particular importance” that the EU attaches to the Eastern Partnership.70 
 
Although the process of developing the EaP was marked by its slow beginning and lack of 
enthusiasm from some member states, it is clear that the EU is becoming increasingly convinced 
of the necessity of engaging in the Eastern neighbourhood. The partner countries (PCs) are 
considered utterly important; not only because of their geostrategic positions, but also because 
the strong desire (in at least some of them) to integrate with Europe make them more susceptible 
for EU-influence than other non-member states. Hence, engaging in the Eastern neighbourhood 
can be interpreted as a means for the EU to confirm and strengthen its (self-understood) 
reputation as a global actor.  
                                                 
68 European Commission, 2008, p. 2 
69 European Commission, 2008, p. 2 and EC, External Relations, Eastern Partnership. According to Hillion et al, 
2009, p. 5, the Commission‟s proposal does not differ too much from the Polish-Swedish initiative.  
70 EC official 5. Before the establishment of the Task Force, DG RELEX was the responsible unit.  
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
The previous chapter set the empirical frame for the analysis by highlighting the possibilities and 
restrictions for the EU as a foreign policy actor. However, we need also consider the theoretical 
framework. How does studying the internal process of policy-making enable a greater 
understanding of high-profiled “political” questions such as foreign policy and how does 
previous research conceptualise strategies for norm promotion? Aiming to answer these 
questions the current chapter elaborates the argument for why the internal process of policy-
making merits attention in this context and discusses the concept of norms in international 
relations. It also defines the key concepts of the two theories about strategies for norm 
promotion – the external incentives model and the social learning model – that form the 
foundation for the forthcoming analysis. 
 
3.1 Politicians and bureaucrats 
“…politicians make policy; civil servants administer. Politicians make decisions, bureaucrats merely 
implement them”.71 
 
In this manner Aberbach et al. succinctly summarise the commonly held conception of the ideal 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Whereas politicians formulate visionary goals 
and set the political agenda, civil servants are assigned to convert these goals into concrete 
policies operable in the day to day work. From one point of view the dichotomy of 
politicians/civil servants is obvious – there are important differences in terms of appointment 
procedures, roles and legitimacy that make them analytically separable. At second glance, 
however, this distinction is less clear cut. In his classical analysis of the modern bureaucracy, Max 
Weber acknowledged the complicated relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, pointing 
at the power asymmetry generated by politicians‟ needs for bureaucratic expertise. Because 
politicians lack the resources (in terms of knowledge, information and time) to transform policy 
goals to realistic plans and to implement them they become dependent on their civil servants for 
doing so. For this reason, Weber deemed the ideal type pictured above improbable – regardless 
of its normative desirability. 72   
 
                                                 
71 Aberbach et al, 1981, p.4. See also Rothstein, 2001, p. 7ff. 
72 Aberbach et al, 1981, p. 5ff and Huber et al. 2002, p. 17ff.  
  
  22 
   
 
Weber‟s analysis set the agenda for research on modern bureaucracies and today there is wide 
agreement in the academic literature that the civil servants play key roles in the processes of 
policy-making as well as implementation. David Easton‟s figure of the flow in a political system 
helps to elucidate the interplay between political goals and policy output and, in extension, the 
role played by civil servants:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : A model of the political system, based on Easton, 1979, p. 112 
 
Figure 1 suggests that political goals must pass through what has been called the “black box of 
policy-making”. Because civil servants are positioned within this very box, they are crucial actors 
in the policy-making process. The implication is thus that in current political systems 
 
…countless important policy decisions are made by the bureaucracy rather than the legislature. By 
delegating decisions, the legislature takes advantage of the bureaucracy‟s expertise in the policy area 
under consideration.
73
 
 
Bennedsen et al. point to the fact that civil servants are not merely central to the policy-making 
process; they moreover possess a fair amount of autonomy in relation to the explicitly formulated 
political goals – a phenomenon that has been conceptualised as “bureaucratic autonomy”. But 
why are politicians willing to compromise with their power? This simple, but yet very important 
question is often answered with reference to the growing complexity of governance. The mere 
amount of policies and their often detailed nature is claimed to set limits for politicians‟ 
involvement: the degree of expertise needed in order to transform all political goals into concrete 
policies is simply too high.74 Hence, the Weberian as well as current analyses about the 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats suggest that there are good reason for delegating 
(some degree of) authority to the administration. Delegation might even be considered a practical 
necessity – after all, it would be impossible for politicians to handle every single question in every 
                                                 
73 Bennedsen et al, 2006, p. 643  
74 Huber et al. 2002, p. 19 
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single policy process. Bureaucrats are needed for the political systems to function. Yet, the reason 
for granting bureaucrats this autonomy – their expertise – is also potentially problematic. Huber 
et al. describe bureaucratic expertise as a “…double-edged sword, creating both the incentive for 
legislatures to give policy-making power to bureaucrats and the opportunity for these bureaucrats 
to act counter to legislative preferences.”75According to this line of reasoning, it is (apart from the 
skills) the responsiveness of the bureaucrats assigned to shape and implement policies that 
determines whether or not a certain political goal gets the effect sought for, rather than solely the 
politicians‟ intentions. From a democracy point of view this is of course questionable: whereas 
politicians can be held accountable in the general elections, there is no corresponding mechanism 
for the citizens to hold civil servants accountable for undesired policy choices/outcomes. On the 
other hand, it can be claimed that politicians can and should be held accountable for civil 
servants‟ actions as it is they who are responsible for the decision to delegate power. What is 
essential, however, is that any attempt to understand the dynamics of political processes requires 
that the internal process of policy-making is taken into account. 76  
 
3.1.1 Bureaucratic autonomy in the European Union 
Mainstream media and political debaters sometimes picture the European Union as an unwieldy 
organisation of administration, made up of bureaucrats more concerned with the shape of 
cucumbers than urgent political questions. To some extent this description of the bureaucratic 
EU can be written off as scurrilous portraits stemming from lack of knowledge and/or EU-
scepticism, but the fact is that academic research indicate that there is some relevance to this 
image. As mentioned in the introduction, it has been claimed that civil servants play a more 
important role at the EU than the national level because of the nature of EU policies. EU policies 
tend to be regulatory – as opposed to „political‟ – in character, demanding therefore a high degree 
of expertise in order to be put into practice. This, it is argued, makes them more suitable for 
technocratic (bureaucratic) decision-making than the more politicised policies in the member 
states.77 In this regard the civil servants staffing the Commission (the EU‟s highest executive 
authority) are considered to play key roles in the EU policy-making process, setting the agenda 
for and shaping the form of policies.78  
                                                 
75 Huber et al, 2002, p. 19 
76 Rothstein, 2001, p. 11, Huber et al. 2002, p. 19 
77 Beyers et al, 2004, p. 1120 and Tallberg, 2002, p. 23ff. Majone is one of the main proponents of this argument. See 
Majone, 1998 
78 Beyers et al, 2004, p. 1120. As the Commissioners are appointed by the member states‟ governments and (the 
Commisison as a whole) must be approved by the European Parliament it can be argued that some link between 
them and the European citizens exists. However, they are very far from being directly democratically elected.  
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While not challenging the reasons for nor the importance of taking the administration into 
account in political analyses, Beyers et al. complicate the image of the European Union policy-
making as regulative and depoliticised. They argue that their empirical analysis of how different 
interests affect the processes of EU policy-making suggests that the degree of depoliticisation has 
been exaggerated. Concluding that the bureaucratic autonomy is greater by definition in the EU 
context than the national is misleading because the EU policy-making process is marked by a 
wide range of internal variations. The civil servants‟ freedom of manoeuvre is highly dependent 
on their location within the EU policy system. Beyers et al. furthermore claim that for this 
reason, the dichotomy of politicians/bureaucrats usually employed is ill suited to the EU context. 
Instead, they propose a distinction between technical bureaucrats (who come close to the 
Weberian ideal type) and political bureaucrats (who are to combine technical expertise with 
politicians‟ legitimacy concerns). While the former type can be found in the Commissioners‟ 
Directorate Generals, the latter is typically situated in Commission cabinets as well as the 
member states‟ foreign ministries and permanent representations. The implication of their 
distinction is that while political bureaucrats enjoy – and tend to make use of – a high degree of 
autonomy, technical bureaucrats tend to simply act in accordance with the frames given.79  
 
3.1.2 The argument for considering the internal policy- making process 
The discussions above allow for a few conclusions to be drawn. First, previous research suggests 
that because bureaucrats play key roles in policy-making as well as implementation, any analysis 
of a political process and outcome should take the administration into account. The good reasons 
for examining the internal process of policy-making have certainly been acknowledged by a 
number of scholars who have attempted to open the “black box of policy-making”.80 Yet, this 
dimension seems to have been overlooked in research about norms in international relations. 
 
Secondly, the argument for considering more than just the outcome (the policy itself) appears to be 
even stronger in the EU- than in the national context. However, given Beyers et al.‟s suggestion 
that the degree of depoliticisation of EU-policy-making has been exaggerated, one should 
nevertheless be wary of potential internal variations in terms of bureaucratic autonomy. Aiming 
to take this aspect into account the dichotomy of technical/political bureaucrat is considered 
when selecting interviewees. How this is done is elaborated in chapter 4.5. Finally, it should be 
                                                 
79 Beyers et al, pp. 1119-1226, p. 1147 
80 Easton, 1979. See for example Uhrwing 2001 
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pointed out yet again that it is neither the policy process as such nor the extent of bureaucratic 
influence that are objects of interest in this thesis. Rather, the conceptions of the civil servants are 
used as instruments to examine how strategies for norm promotion are conceived in the EU system. 
In other words, the importance of the internal process of policy-making is presumed rather than 
examined.81  
 
3.2 Norms in international relations 
The concept of norms is frequently used but rarely explained: what do we mean when we refer to 
“norms”? The aim of this thesis is to elaborate our understanding of how norm promotion is 
conceived within the EU-system, rather than to examine the EU-norms as such. Nevertheless, in 
order to lay down the theoretical basis for the analysis to come, a brief introduction to how 
norms and normative power have been conceptualised in international relation‟s research seems 
called for. I then direct my attention to the theories about norm promotion/compliance.  
 
It has been questioned why political theory and international relations should at all study norms: 
after all, most would agree that there is a vast difference between what is in the world and what 
ought to be. Finnemore et al. give a powerful answer to this question, pointing to the fact that 
empirical research “…documents again and again how peoples‟ ideas about what is good and 
what „should be‟ in the world become translated into political reality”.82 In other words: if we 
want to understand the is of international affairs, also the ought to be needs to be taken into 
account. There seems to be general agreement on the definition of norms as “…a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”.83 Elaborating this basic definition, 
different categories or dimensions of norms have been recognised. The distinction most 
commonly made is that between regulative norms (which order and restrain behaviour) and 
constitutive norms (which create new interests, actors or categories of action). Yet, as Finnemore et 
al. note the very essence of the concept is perhaps best captured by the category of evaluative or 
prescriptive norms since  
 
…it is precisely the prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of „oughtness‟ that sets norms apart from other 
kinds of rules. Because norms involve standards of „appropriate‟ or „proper‟ behaviour, both the 
intersubjective and the evaluative dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms.84 
                                                 
81 For similar reasons, I will not go deeper into the discussion about the normative desirability of bureaucratic 
autonomy.  
82 Finnemore et al. 1998, p. 916 
83 Finnemore et al. 1998, p. 891 
84 Finnemore et al, 1998, p. 891 
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The obvious – but yet rarely acknowledged – implication of this is that from a norm promoter‟s 
perspective there are no bad norms. Norms are established, accepted and become powerful as 
norms exactly because people believe in their goodness and/or appropriateness. Additionally, as 
Finnemore et al. point out when discussing the three-stage process of the norm “life cycle”, 
(norm emergence, broad acceptance and norm internalisation) norms do not appear out of thin 
air. Rather, they tend to be actively built by agents with strong opinions about what is appropriate 
and/or desirable.85 This is certainly illustrated by the manner in which norms and values are 
described and referred to in official EU-documents; not least in the newly adopted Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  Stating that “…the Union is founded on the indivisible, 
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity” the Charter makes it utterly 
clear that the EU regards its core values as universal and nonnegotiable.86 Promoting these very 
values is thus, by definition, good. The implication of this is discussed further in chapter 4.3, 
addressing methodological considerations.  
 
3.2.1 The concept of normative power and the “normative power Europe”-
thesis 
How can power be normative? The concept seems to suffer from a built in contradiction: on the 
one hand “power” indicates an ability to make someone do something they would not do 
otherwise, “normative”, on the other, alludes to legitimacy. On second glance, however, the 
concept highlights important dimensions of how agents of international affairs can influence 
others in the absence of (or serve as an alternative to) hard power means. It moreover enables us 
to acknowledge that while “traditional” sources of power imposes observance, normative power 
builds on a higher degree of voluntariness as it presupposes willingness to comply from the target. 
So, while recognising the problematic nature of the concept I nonetheless argue that it is 
meaningful from an analytical point of view.  
 
The lack of military means is frequently mentioned as a core aspect of normative power but 
should not be considered synonymous to nor in itself enough to capture the essence of the 
concept. Rather, normative power refers to the power of ideas, the ideational impact or the ability 
to influence what is conceived as normal.87 Or, put differently, the “power” is composed of a right to 
define the appropriate. Yet, the ability to do so is dependent on how the norm initiator/promoter 
                                                 
85 Finnemore et al. 1998, p. 894ff 
86 European Parliament et al. 2000, p. 8 
87 Manners, 2002, p. 238. 
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is conceived by the recipient part. In order to become a “normative power” able to influence and 
even shape other actors‟ conceptions of appropriate behaviour, the agent promoting norms (and 
the norms that are promoted) must be perceived as legitimate. 88   
 
This thesis took the EU‟s attempts to portray itself as a promoter of norms as point of departure. 
By continuously referring to the importance of respecting principles such as human rights and 
democracy in its foreign policies and by adopting a Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Union 
seeks to strengthen its identity as a community based on values. As noted in the introduction, 
there is a growing bulk of research discussing whether this means that the EU should be regarded 
a normative power or not. On the one hand, claims have been made that the EU represents 
something qualitatively new in international relations, acting as a changer of norms rather than 
relying on employing traditional (“hard power”) foreign policy instruments. According to the 
main proponent of the (new) “normative power Europe”-thesis, Ian Manners, the EU is not only 
constructed on a normative basis, but this moreover “…predisposes it to act in a normative way 
in world politics”.89 On the other hand, opponents have pointed out that EU foreign policy is 
marked by ambiguity and that the ambition to promote norms is far from the sole motivator for 
EU involvement in the neighbourhood.90 Since it is not objective truth of the EU as a norm 
promoter that is the subject of interest here I will not go deeper into this discussion. It should 
nevertheless be noted that irrespective of how the effectiveness (and desirability) of EU norm 
promotion is conceived, most scholars agree that value promotion is a core feature of the EU‟s 
identity.91  But how does it seek to do so and how do the civil servants assigned to convert the 
political goal of spreading norms reason about alternative strategies? In order to answer this, we 
must first consider the theoretical understanding of strategies for norm promotion. This is the 
question to which we now turn. 
 
3.2.2 Strategies for norm promotion    
The issue that has attracted most attention in recent research about norms in international 
relations is the issue of change. What motivates agents to adopt new norms? And, switching from 
a target to an initiator perspective; what strategies do norm promoters employ to spread values?  
 
                                                 
88 Sjursén, 2006, p. 236ff, 245. See also Finnemore et al 1998 and Schimmelfennig et al. 2005 
89 Manners, 2002, p. 252 
90 See for example Wood, 2009 and Barbé et al, 2008 
91 Sjursén, 2006, p. 238 
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Most theories aiming to describe and explain norm promotion/norm compliance make use of 
two “logics of action” motivating change: the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriate-
ness. This distinction follows the broad debates between rationalism and constructivism in inter-
national relations (or rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism in compara-
tive politics). The rationalist approach is actor-centred and builds on the assumption that agents 
are interest driven and rational in the sense that they seek to maximise their benefits based on the 
information at hand. Constructivists, in turn, acknowledge that agents have interests but claim that 
these interests are the results of the structures (made up of ideas, norms and identities) surround-
ing them rather than being determining factors themselves. Among alternative courses of action, 
actors tend to choose the most legitimate or appropriate one, seeking to act in accordance with 
what is expected from them.92 The basic assumptions just described lead to different interpreta-
tions about how – and why – agents are motivated to adhere to new norms. While the former 
approach views consequentiality as the main mechanism, the latter emphasises the mechanism of 
socialisation.  
 
Aiming to take both these interpretations into account, the theoretical model in this thesis largely 
builds on Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier‟s framework for analysis. Albeit developed to be 
applied in the context of European integration, their model represents a „mainstream‟ among 
international relations‟ theories about norm promotion and compliance. They offer three 
explanatory models of how and why norm (rule) adoption occurs: the external incentive model, 
the social learning model and the lesson-drawing model. The models differ on two key 
dimensions: the logic of action that applies (logic of consequence or logic of appropriateness) and 
whether the process of rule adoption is EU-driven (norm initiator driven) or CEEC-driven 
(target driven).  As table 1 illustrates, both the external incentives model and the social learning 
model are classified as norm initiators-driven, whereas the norm recipient is regarded the 
principal actor in the lesson-drawing model.93 
 
 
Principal actor in the rule 
adoption process 
Logic of rule adoption 
Logic of consequence Logic of appropriateness 
EU-driven External incentives model Social learning model 
CEEC-driven Lesson-drawing model Lesson-drawing model 
 
                                                 
92 Schimmelfennig et al, 2005, p. 9ff 
93 It can be noted that that the external incentives model is framed as the model for explaining norm compliance 
whereas the social learning model and the lesson-drawing model are presented as alternative explanatory models.  
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Table 1: Alternative mechanisms of Europeanization from Schimmelfennig et al. 2005, p. 8 
 
Given that this thesis aims to examine how strategies for norm promotion are conceived in the 
internal process of policy-making, the principal actor is presumed rather than object of 
investigation. The focus lies on the norm initiator (the EU) as opposed to the target perspective, 
which is why the target-driven lesson-drawing model is left aside for the benefit of the EU-driven 
external incentives model and the social learning model. 94 These, in turn, have been elaborated 
with the aid of McDonagh‟s conceptualisation of strategies for democracy promotion as she 
offers a more easily applicable description of the concrete instruments.  
 
Building on the assumption that agents are rational interest-maximisers, the rationalist external incen-
tives model interprets norm adherence as the result of cost-benefit calculations carried out by 
agents who aim to minimise costs and maximise benefits. The rationale of the process is the logic 
of consequence. Essentially, this means that norms are viewed and treated as alternatives between 
which the agent can choose. Whether or not norms are adopted is considered to depend on how 
well they correspond to a given agent‟s interests. Hence, acting 
 
…on the basis of the logic of consequentiality…includes the following steps: a. What are my alterna-
tives? b. What are my values? c. What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values? d. 
Choose the alternative that has the best expected consequences.95  
 
The main mechanism through which norms are promoted is conditionality and the instruments in-
centives: norm recipients are presented with positive and/or negative incentives in return for 
norm compliance. Negative incentives typically comprise (the threat of) sanctions whereas posi-
tive incentives range from trade and/or cooperation agreements to full membership of a given 
organisation. The core assumption is that agents comply with political conditionality because – 
and when – the “…positive incentives („carrots‟) on offer are crucial for them, or the costs of 
negative incentives („sticks‟) exceed the costs of compliance”.96 Moreover, the external incentives 
model understands the interplay between norm promoters and norm recipients as a bargaining 
process in which information, threats and promises are exchanged. The outcome of this process 
is determined by the relative bargaining power of the actors involved. This, in turn, depends on 
the asymmetrical distribution of “…(1) information and (2) the benefits of a specific agreement 
compared with those of alternative outcomes or „outside options‟”.97 Thus, a norm promoter‟s 
                                                 
94 For more information about the lesson-drawing model and its relation two the other two, see Schimmelfennig et 
al, 2005. p. 20ff.  
95 March et al, 2004, p. 5 
96 McDonagh, 2008, p. 144 and Schimmelfennig et al. 2005, p. 10 
97 Schimmelfennig et al. 2005. p. 10ff 
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success largely depends on how the target country perceives the relation between expected bene-
fits for adopting norms on the one hand, and the internal situation as well as alternative external 
interests on the other.  
 
The constructivist social learning model, on the other hand, concentrates on the interplay between 
agents and structures and builds on the assumption that actions are identity-based and driven by 
rules of appropriateness rather than cost-benefit calculations. The rationale of the process of norm 
adoption is the logic of appropriateness. Because agents seek to live up the obligations defined by 
their role as members of a certain group, norms are adopted only if and when doing so 
corresponds to what is expected behaviour for them in a given situation. Thus, acting on the 
logic of appropriateness means asking oneself: “What kind of situation is this? What kind of 
person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation like this”?98 This infers that, similarly 
to the rationalist interpretation, norm adoption is conceived as a result of a conscious choice; the 
difference lies in the reasons motivating the choices made. In purpose to initiate and facilitate the 
three stage process of norm adoption – exposure, habituation and internalisation – norm 
promoters make use of the mechanisms of socialisation and normative pressure. Instead of linking 
norm compliance to specific incentives value promoters rely on the instruments of persuasion and 
social influence (naming and shaming). Persuasion is employed to change the minds and ideas 
and in extension the identity of the norm recipient. Making use of the social influence-
instrument, on the other hand, means praising or pressurising the recipient into adopting norms, 
building on the assumption that  
 
…actors will conform to policy change requests from the outside because they value certain social 
rewards (such as status, legitimacy, a sense of belonging) or want to avoid social punishments (such as 
shaming, shunning, exclusion).99 
 
It can be noted that just like norms never appear out of thin air, they rarely enter a normative 
vacuum: rather, they emerge into a space in which they compete with other, alternative norms. 
This infers that norm advocators trying to motivate new norms through invoking a logic of 
appropriateness (must) contest existing standards of appropriateness. In extension and 
paradoxically enough, in order to challenge the existing standards, norm promoters may need to 
be explicitly “inappropriate”. 100 Hence, the core of the social learning model is that a government 
will adopt a given norm if/when it is persuaded about the appropriateness of doing so.101 
                                                 
98 March et al, 2004, p. 4. p. 3ff 
99 McDonagh, 2008, p. 145 
100 Finnemore et al. 1998, p. 894ff 
101 Schimmelfennig et al, 2005, p. 18 
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What can be said about the empirical effectiveness of the strategies discussed above? Building on 
their analysis of how norms and standards of the candidate countries were affected by the 2004 
EU-enlargement, Schimmelfennig et al. come to the conclusion that incentives in general and the 
incentive of EU-membership in particular are crucial aspects of the Union‟s ability to promote 
norms. Yet, even though  
 
…EU incentives become a sufficient condition for rule adoption and trump all alternative 
mechanisms once the EU provides a credible membership perspective and spells out its requirements, 
EU incentives are not a necessary condition for rule adoption.102 
 
In other words, employing the logic and mechanisms of the external incentives model should not 
be interpreted as the sole means to become a successful norm promoter: also the social learning 
model can prove efficient. Moreover, Schimmelfennig et al.‟s result suggest that whether or not 
external incentives alone are what motivates the acceptance process have important 
consequences for the form and impact of norm adoption. Perhaps hardly a surprise, rules adopted 
through social-learning and lessons learned tend to be less contested in the domestic context and 
therefore more likely to be viable and sustainable in a long-term perspective. The potential of 
using strategies other than conditionality should in other words not be underestimated.103 
 
3.2.3 Foreign policy: interest-driven or milieu oriented?  
Having explored the main dividing lines between the two explanatory theories employed in this 
thesis, we are almost ready to move on to the theoretical model. Before doing so, however, there 
is one additional aspect that deserves attention: what are the motives for agents to act in certain 
ways in international relations and, more specifically, why do they engage in norm promotion? 
International relations theory largely separate between three main perspectives seeking to explain 
state (or organisation) behaviour in international politics: realism, liberalism and constructivism. 
The realist school of thought view states as the key actors of international affairs and assumes 
that states are 1) rational in the sense that they seek to optimise their interest based on the 
information at hand and 2) motivated by a combination of drive for power and the pursuit of 
national interest(s). However, the anarchic nature of the international system renders the main 
interest – security – utterly hard to obtain. Because of the absence of a sovereign authority to 
enforce the rule of law and punish wrongdoers and because of the assumption that international 
politics is a zero-sum game, realists claim that states can never trust each others intentions. The 
                                                 
102 Schimmelfennig et al, 2005, p. 218 
103 Schimmelfennig et al. 2005, p. 219 
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quest for security thus becomes a constant struggle and conflict an ever present reality; states can 
never be secure enough. This, in turn, makes international cooperation a highly complicated issue 
and something that will happen for balancing/bandwagon reasons only.104 Similarly to realists, 
liberals acknowledge that states are central actors of international relations. Yet, according to the 
liberal perspective states are by no means the only relevant actors: also international organisations 
determine the dynamics of the system. Building on the assumption that moral universal values 
exist (the main ones being individual liberty and human rights) and that international politics are 
marked by harmony of interest rather than anarchy, liberals argue that international cooperation 
is both likely and rational. Actors are certainly considered to be motivated by interest but from 
the liberal point of view their interest is guided by preference (determined by domestic factors 
and international norms) rather than egoism.105 Constructivism, in turn, is often interpreted as a 
middle-way theory, seeking to bridge the gap between the extremes of neo-realism and 
postmodernism. With the assumption that no social features are given as their starting point, 
constructivists focus on the interplay between structures and agents and emphasise the impact of 
norms and institutions on international politics. Foreign policy is considered to be “…not only a 
matter of national interest, but also of acceptable behaviour in the international society”.106. While 
acknowledging the importance of interest, constructivists argue that identity and culture are key 
determinants of an agent‟s actions, pointing at the context dependency of preference 
formation.107  
 
Depending on the perspective taken, different conclusions as regards the motivations behind and 
objectives with an actor‟s foreign policy can be drawn. Whereas realists underline security 
concerns as both the starting point and goal for international politics, liberals and constructivists 
instead point at the importance of preference. But while liberals hold that the preference for 
universal moral values is given, constructivists point at context and identity as explanations. How 
does this help us to attain this thesis‟ aim: to examine how strategies for norm promotion are 
conceived in the internal process of policy-making? I argue that to fully understand why certain 
strategies are preferred over alternative ones we must link the choice of these strategies in relation 
to the overarching goal of the given actor and/or policy. If the main goal of the European Union is 
to employ the Eastern Partnership as a forum for obtaining the liberal/constructivist goal of 
                                                 
104 Steans et al, 2005, p. 49ff 
105 Steans et al, 2005, pp. 21-46 
106 Steans et al. 2005, p. 185 
107 Steans et al, 2005, pp. 181-189. The principal difference between the liberal and the constructivist interpretation 
of preference is thus that while liberals view preferences as predetermined, constructivist emphasise that they emerge 
in specific contexts and are linked to specific identities. 
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promoting values, it seems reasonable to believe that the perceived efficiency of the possible 
strategies was the key determining factor in the policy preparations. If the EU‟s intention with the 
EaP is more in line with realist objectives (increased energy security for example) then it can be 
expected that other aspects than the efficiency of strategies for value promotion guided the 
policy-making choices.  
 
In an attempt to elucidate the different motives underlying states‟ foreign policies, Tocci 
distinguishes between possession and milieu goals. Milieu goals aim at transforming the 
international context through the promotion of peace and democracy as well as principles such as 
human rights and the rule of law. Possession goals on the other hand, aim at protecting and 
advancing narrower (often material) interests such as commercial relations, border management 
or energy security. Clearly, the pursuit of possession goals can be interpreted in terms of the 
realist conceptions of how states act. Milieu oriented goals, on the other hand, correspond both 
to the liberal notion of harmony of interest and the constructivist emphasis on international 
norms as a key determinant of state behaviour. However, empirical analyses indicate that most 
foreign policy choices are guided by both milieu and possession goals and that the extent to 
which milieu goals are pursued tend to depend on the importance of alternative (possession 
oriented) objectives.108 Barbé et al. claim that because material gains and moral impulses are so 
closely intertwined foreign policy is about balancing possession and milieu goals rather than 
choosing one approach. Moreover, although the pursuit of a possession oriented foreign policy 
often conflicts with milieu goals, this is far from always the case. As Tocci notes, milieu and 
possession goals can in fact be combined: 
 
The advancement of allegedly milieu goals may underlie the pursuit of narrower possession objectives. 
Imposing sanctions or waging war in the name of democracy or human rights can cover aims such as 
protecting energy security. (…) Moreover, milieu and possession goals may well be compatible if not 
mutually reinforcing in the long-term.109 
 
This leads to the conclusion that drawing a fixed line between the two types of goals is a fairly 
complicated issue and something that is perhaps not even desirable. The point is, however, that 
the (analytical) distinction enables us to acknowledge and examine the logical chain between 
intentions, goals and policy choices. In purpose to allow for this to be taken into account in the 
forthcoming analysis, the two ideal types of foreign policy goals are included in the theoretical 
model of strategies for norm promotion.  
                                                 
108 Tocci 2007, p. 28ff. See also Barbé et al. 2008 and Wood, 2009. 
109 Tocci 2007, pp. 29-30 and Barbé et al. 2008, pp. 83-84 
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3.2.4 Theoretical model of strategies for norm promotion 
The theoretical perspectives outlined above indicated the key concepts of the external incentives 
model and the social learning model respectively. Aiming to make these concepts applicable in 
the forthcoming analysis, figure 1. Strategies for norm promotion, has been developed to clarify the 
interconnections between assumptions, mechanisms and instruments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Strategies for norm promotion 
 
The external incentives model builds on rationalist assumptions and explains norm compliance 
with reference to the logic of consequence: agents will adopt norms if and when doing so is 
considered beneficial. Employing the instrument of (positive and/or negative) incentives norm 
promoters build on the mechanism of conditionality in their attempts to promote norms. Their 
success depends on the degree to which the benefits of adopting new norms outweigh the costs 
of doing so. The point of departure of the social learning model, in turn, is a constructivist 
approach which emphasises the process of socialisation as the change provoking mechanism. 
Building on a logic of appropriateness, it interprets norm compliance as a consequence of 
normative pressure. Norms are promoted through persuasion about their intrinsic goodness and 
appropriateness and through shaming and praising the norm recipient into norm acceptance.  
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As discussed earlier, the lack of previous research about how strategies for norm promotion are 
conceived in the internal process of policy-making mean that there are no theoretically grounded 
expectations to guide the analysis. By employing the theoretical model as a framework for 
analysis, the ambition is to elaborate our understanding of strategies for norm promotion by 
adding the perspective of the civil servants involved in the policy preparations. How can the 
concepts and assumptions of the social learning and external incentives model help us 
understand how the civil servants reason about the choice of certain strategies? And, in 
extension, are there aspects that the model developed above fails to take into account?  
  
  36 
   
 
4. Methodological considerations  
 
With the theoretical and empirical frameworks in place, some specifications as regards the 
research questions and the design of the thesis are called for. Aiming to give the clearest picture 
possible of the concrete way of action and the intentions behind the chosen approach, the 
present chapter discusses methodological considerations as well as the relevance and limitations 
of the study.  
 
4.1 Relevance and limitations of the study 
By leaving the policy-making process aside and not considering the conceptions held by civil 
servants, previous research about norm promotion has missed a potential source of insights 
about the motivations behind the choice of certain strategies. Building on the arguments 
elaborated in chapter 3.1, the premise of this thesis is that the internal process of policy-making 
matters and should be taken into account. By letting the Eastern Partnership serve as a policy-
making case and as an independent object of analysis the intention is to fulfil the theoretical and 
empirical aim.  The theoretical aim is to contribute to the theories about norm 
compliance/promotion by focusing on the promoter rather than the target and adding the 
perspective of the internal process of policy-making. The empirical aim is to increase the 
knowledge of the Eastern Partnership in general and its relation to the EU‟s foreign policy 
ambition to spread values in particular. My argument is that by studying the preparatory work of 
the Eastern Partnership, we will elaborate our understanding of how norm promotion is 
perceived by the people who are in a position to choose between strategies for doing so and gain 
a more multifaceted picture of the importance of norm promotion in the policy as well as its 
relation to the EU‟s general foreign policy goals than what would have been possible by solely 
looking at the policy as such.   
 
The relevance of this study is twofold. The intra-scientific relevance concerns the theory 
testing/developing part: several existing studies examine the preconditions for norms to be 
adopted, but less attention has been directed towards how norm promoters conceive strategies 
for norm promotion. More specifically, previous research has failed to take the role played by 
civil servants and how norm promotion is perceived in the internal process of policy-making into 
consideration. Hence, I aim to contribute to the theoretical understanding of strategies for norm 
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promotion by directing attention to the rationale and motivations behind choosing certain 
strategies over others.  
 
The societal relevance in turn, concerns the relation between the European Union‟s goals and the 
politics pursued. If norm promotion is one of the Union‟s main foreign policy objectives (which the 
Lisbon Treaty states that it is) it is of course essential that the day to day practice corresponds to 
this objective. As the Eastern Partnership has been presented and interpreted a tool for spreading 
values, the European citizens clearly have an interest to know to what extent the ambitions to do 
so actually guided the policy outcome. Is the EU credible in its claims of spreading values such as 
democracy and human rights? Given that previous research and practical experiences indicate 
that the prospect of EU-membership is a key incentive in promoting EU-norms, the absence of 
the membership perspective in the EaP context renders this highly questionable.  
 
The main limitation of the study stems from the fact that solely one case is examined, reducing 
thereby the possibility to generalise the result. In order to address this issue and improve the 
preconditions for drawing general conclusions, the sample selection procedure (in terms of case 
as well as interviewees) has been considered very carefully. As will be elaborated further in 
chapter five, the sample selection has been strategically made. Another weakness concerns the 
sensitivity of the subject that is explored and the possibility to gain access to the “true” 
motivations. Is it reasonable to expect that the interviewees will be honest about the motivations 
behind the Eastern Partnership if this does not correspond to the general image presented in the 
official documents? Certainly, the description of the European Union as a value promoter as 
opposed to an actor aiming to pursue possession goals is more in line with the self-image of the 
EU. Notwithstanding this, it is far from evident that all civil servants staffing the EU are in fact 
loyal to the image given in the official EU-documents – it might in other words well be that they 
themselves reflect upon and express concerns about potential ambiguities. As previously noted, 
reaching “....to the „hearts and souls‟ of policy makers” is hardly doable; what we can do, however, 
is be aware of potential motives for giving a specific picture and be utterly sensitive for this when 
analysing the result.110 The sensitivity of a matter (and the from this resulting challenges) is not in 
itself an argument for not studying it.  
 
                                                 
110 Sjursén, 2002, p. 496 
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4.2 Approach and design 
Conceptions are rarely coherent or perfectly logical; rather they tend to be complex and some-
times even ambiguous. Aiming to take this complexity into account and reflect as many nuances 
as possible, this thesis builds on a qualitative approach. Investigating internal processes of policy-
making is a complicated issue: negotiations and discussions tend to be highly confidential and 
policy drafts are rarely available for public scrutiny. In general then, the only way to gain access to 
the process is through the civil servants involved. Talking to them enables us to reach (at least one 
bit) into the "black box of policy-making". In order to fulfil the theoretical and empirical aim of 
this thesis, I will conduct conversational interviews with a motive-analysis dimension.   
 
As indicated in chapter 3.2, the taking for granted character of norms complicate the crucial issue 
of how to detect and study their existence and in extension, renders it difficult to investigate how 
norm promotion is conceived. Because norms tend to be assumed rather than problematised it is 
possible (or even likely) that the civil servants assigned to realise the political goal of spreading 
EU-values have not reflected upon neither the content of these values nor the ambition to promote 
them. Questions about strategies for norm promotion (albeit differently phrased) may for this 
reason take the officials by surprise and, in the worst case scenario result in “none” answers. This 
insight must necessarily be borne in mind when preparing as well as conducting the interviews. 
Yet, as Finnemore et al. note, we can in fact gain indirect evidence of the presence of certain 
norms and the key of doing so is to acknowledge and be aware of their inherent quality of ought-
ness. Norms build on shared moral assessment and thus “…prompt justification for action and 
leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study”.111 This implicates 
that norms should be easiest to detect and study in situations where actions are (or are expected 
to come) in conflict with the identity of the given actor.  
 
I argue that one way of (concretely) approaching the question of how strategies for norm promo-
tion are conceived is by investigating the motives for and/or motivations behind the setup of the 
Partnership. Admittedly, neither the study of motives is uncomplicated given that we are forced 
to make do with agents‟ own interpretations – or perhaps rather descriptions – of why they 
choose to act in certain ways. This is especially so when the topic discussed is as sensitive as is 
the Eastern Partnership; we must therefore be wary of the fact that the motives we discover are 
motives chosen and put forth by the agents themselves. The challenges of studying motives do 
however not make it less interesting or important. Attempting to address these challenges, this 
                                                 
111 Finnemore et al. 1998, pp. 89-90 
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thesis follows Esaiasson et al.‟s advice on the matter. First of all, the analysis builds on and will be 
guided by the assumption that by solely mentioning a certain aspect, the agent sends two important 
signals: this certain issue is 1) present in the actor‟s mind and 2) something that the agent wants 
us to acknowledge. For example, for the EU to be regarded as an actor building on the logic of 
consequence in its attempts to promote norms, the civil servants should emphasise the impor-
tance of providing incentives rather than mechanisms for socialisation.   
 
In order to analyse the relative importance of different motives, the manner in which these are 
expressed will be weighed. Hence, aspects strongly emphasised will be interpreted to be of 
greater importance than those mentioned more in passing, as will those that are mentioned fre-
quently and/or early/late in a reply.112 It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the civil ser-
vants might (want to) give a more positive image of the EU as a foreign policy actor (by pointing 
at milieu rather than possession goals, for example) than what is “objectively true”. Although 
admittedly complicating the conclusion-drawing, there is not much to do apart from being aware 
of the risk for too well-directed answers. 
 
Before conducting the interviews however, and in purpose to fulfil the empirical aim, also the 
content of two main official documents of the EaP must be considered.113  This is not least a 
practical necessity – developing a good interview guide requires sound knowledge about the topic 
at hand. By including this examination (which might be conceived a preparatory step) the ambi-
tion is to provide the reader with as much information possible making her thereby better 
equipped to validate my conclusions. Triangulating the interview data moreover improves the 
possibilities of giving a multifaceted picture of the EaP than does relying on interviews or textual 
analysis alone. And finally, one additional motive for including an examination of the Partnership 
documents is that I want to explore potential differences between how values are framed in the 
official documents on the one hand, and how promoting these very values is conceived by the civil 
servants on the other.  
 
4.3 Case selection: the reasons for choosing the Eastern Partnership 
There are two main reasons for choosing the Eastern Partnership as the case of policy-making. 
First of all, the EaP builds on a similar logic as does the enlargement procedures: the partner 
                                                 
112 Esaiasson et al. 2005, pp. 317-330 
113 These are the European Commission‟s Communication about an Eastern Partnership, European Commission, 
2008 and the Joint declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit made by the member states‟ heads of government, 
Council of the European Union, 2009 
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countries are offered incentives in return for reforms and commitment to shared values. Given 
that enlargement has been pictured as the Union‟s most successful foreign policy tool and forum 
for norm promotion yet, it seems reasonable to assume that the motivation for applying this logic 
of consequence is that the EU seeks to make use of the (good) experiences of enlargement. 
Concurrently, since the main incentive of enlargement – membership of the EU – is not offered 
in the EaP context, the EU has made an important lapse from its previous strategy. This in turn, 
makes it plausible to assume that the question of how to best influence others to adopt EU values was 
present in the policy preparations. Put differently, the civil servants are likely to have reflected 
upon and discussed alternative strategies for norm promotion.  
 
Secondly, the great emphasis put on commitment to shared values in the official partnership 
documents indicate that milieu rather than possession goals guided the policy-making choices. 
Given that there are a number of strategic reasons (energy security to name but one) for 
increased EU-engagement in Eastern Europe, it is far from evident that this is in fact the main 
motivation. Hence, the Eastern Partnership preparation is a suitable case also because the 
interplay – or trade off – between milieu and possession goals is likely to have affected the policy 
setup. Finally, the scarcity of previous research concerning the interrelation between the EaP on 
the one hand and the EU‟s general foreign policy goal of promoting values on the other makes it 
still more relevant.      
 
4.4 Selecting interviewees 
The Eastern Partnership builds on an initiative put forth by Sweden and Poland and has since 
then been further concretised by the European Commission and formally adopted by the mem-
ber state‟s governments. Therefore, in the best of worlds this study would include civil servants 
from Sweden, Poland and the Commission, as well as from member states that might represent 
deviant opinions about the subject. Unfortunately, limitations in terms of time and scope mean 
that I must make do with a smaller sample. This is of course problematic given that different 
member states might perceive the motivations behind and rationale with the Eastern partnership 
in different ways. For example, civil servants representing states which place less emphasis on the 
promotion of norms in comparison to Sweden (which has a strong tradition of working for the 
respect of values such as human rights) potentially understand the partnership differently than 
the Swedish officials. Furthermore, also the general attitudes towards Eastern Europe might affect 
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how the member states perceive the EaP.114 While recognising the limitations, I argue that the 
lack of previous research about how strategies for norm promotion are conceived in the policy-
making process renders even a small sample highly interesting.   
 
Aiming to capture the main logic behind the setup of the partnership, I interview officials from 
the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Swedish MFA is chosen over the Polish equivalent 
for practical (in terms of geographical proximity and language) reasons. In order to improve the 
possibility of gaining the most multifaceted image possible given the restrictions at hand I will 
also interview officials from the European Commission Directorate General (DG) responsible 
for preparing and coordinating the EaP. The argument for doing so is twofold: first, including 
the Commission officials means that we allow for potential discrepancies between the member 
states‟ and Community perspectives to be taken into account. Secondly, Beyers et al.‟s analysis 
(presented in chapter 3.1) predicts that the technical bureaucrats of the Commission might inter-
pret their role differently than do the political officials of the Swedish MFA. Whether institutional 
belonging is in fact a factor affecting the ideas about norm promotion remains to be seen.115  
 
Making use of Marshall et al.‟s terminology, we are dealing with so called elite interviews since the 
interviewees are “…selected on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research”.116 
The participants were chosen because of their involvement in the preparatory work of the East-
ern Partnership; it is reasonable to expect that they possess important information and insights 
about the objectives and motivations behind chosen setup. The choice of the specific interview-
ees – the sample strategy – was made strategically, building on an intensity/criterion based ra-
tionale.117 Put simply, I wanted to talk to the persons who could be expected to be as knowledge-
able as possible about the policy as a whole (rather than just specific parts) and who were closest 
to the shaping of the policy outcome. Expected knowledge and organisational position were thus 
key determinants. When possible, officials in more central positions (for example heads of units) 
were therefore chosen before lower positioned officials. The Swedish MFA-population relevant 
for my purpose turned out to consist of two persons which rendered a total population sample 
possible. As regards the European Commission, the number of relevant persons was somewhat 
larger (nine persons). As interviewing all of them would have been too time-consuming, I let the 
                                                 
114 There is a clear divide between the Eastern European countries of Sweden and Poland and the pro-enlargement 
European Commission on the one hand, and the more Eastern Europe-sceptic southern member sates on the other. 
It is not too far a guess to assume that this is related to the factor of financial rivalry between regions. See for 
example Hillion et al, 2009, p. 6 
115 Beyers et al, p. 1119, pp. 1225-1226, p. 1147 
116 Marshall et al, 2006, p. 105 
117 Marshall et al. 2006, p. 65ff 
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principle of intensity of information described above together with the recommendations made 
by my contact at the Swedish MFA guide the choice of interviewees. Since all but one of the six I 
contacted were willing to participate, I interviewed in total five officials from the European 
Commission.118 Aiming to increase the reliability – and thereby the credibility – of the study, I 
asked the interviewees for permission to record the interviews. None declined. 
 
4.5 The interviews 
Since the ambition is to understand both how the civil servants involved in the policy-making 
process of the EaP perceive norm promotion and gain information about the policy as such, the 
interviews can be described as a mixture of respondent and informant interviews. Particularly the 
respondent dimension renders the concrete interview-setup important. For reliability reasons, it 
was essential that all interviews followed the same general pattern and that all interviewees were 
asked (at least fairly) the same interview questions.119 Notwithstanding this, one of the main ad-
vantages of employing in-depth interviews rather than surveys for example, is the (potential) flexi-
bility of the method: it allows for the interviewee to raise aspects not pre-defined and enables the 
interviewer to follow up interesting dimensions. Aiming to balance and make use of the benefits 
of flexibility while still assuring the reliability of the study, a semi-structured interview (specifying 
the overarching themes and some concrete interview questions) guided the interviews.  (See ap-
pendix 1). The informant part of the interviews, in turn, renders the empirical correctness of the 
civil servants statements about the EaP important. In purpose to give an as accurate description 
possible of the EaP, I follow Rossman et al.‟s. advice to triangulate the data, including also an 
analysis of the official Eastern Partnership-documents.  
 
As regards the concrete way of action, the ideal approach would have been to conduct all inter-
views face to face in order to maximise the similarity of setting and to allow for aspects such as 
facial expressions and body language to be taken into account. Due to lack of resources, how-
ever, merely the interviews with the civil servants of the Swedish MFA were carried out face to 
face; the Commission officials were interviewed by telephone. Although this admittedly chal-
lenges the reliability of the result, I regard the value of including both the Commission and the 
Swedish MFA combined with the advantages with face to face interviews to outweigh the (possi-
ble) disadvantages. Therefore, I argue that the difference in the way of action is defendable. An-
                                                 
118 The generally difficult task of gaining access to the Commission was facilitated by the fact that I could refer to my 
contact at the Swedish MFA – letting her/him serve as a “gate opener”.  Both the Swedish MFA and the 
Commission officials were contacted via email – see appendix 1.  
119 Esaiasson et al. 2005, p. 253ff, 279ff and Marshall et al. 2006, p. 102 
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other potential problem from a methodological point of view is that the interviews with all but 
one of the Commission staff were conducted in English whereas one Commission official and 
both civil servants from the Swedish MFA were interviewed in Swedish. Of course, speaking 
another language than one‟s mother tongue increases the risk of misinterpretations, but as both I 
and the interviewees have English as our working language, I regard this to be a minor problem. 
More problematic, however, is that the meanings of concepts are not necessarily equally well cap-
tured in the two languages, which might result in different interpretations on the part of the in-
terviewees. Yet, this disadvantage must be weighed against the advantages of speaking one‟s na-
tive language and the risk of creating a gap between me and the respondent by insisting on using 
English instead of Swedish. When speaking Swedish was an option I therefore choose to do so 
(with the obvious consequence that any quotes by these officials have been translated by me to 
English).  
 
Finally, some remarks about the issue of ethics are called for. In the interview situation as well as 
in analysing the data, I followed the advices and principles of the Swedish Research Council. The 
interviewees were informed about the purpose of the research and that their contribution is vol-
untary (informed consent). Because of the sensitive nature of the subject and given that the rele-
vant divide between the two groups of interviewees is the institutional belonging (the Commission 
or the Swedish MFA) rather than their organisational positions; I choose to let the participants be 
anonymous in the analysis. By promising the respondents maximum confidentiality and that they, 
when quoted, would be referred to as “one of the Commission officials” or “one of the Swedish 
MFA officials” I judged that they would feel able to speak  more freely than what otherwise 
would have been the case. In the end, however, it is impossible to make sure that the interview-
ees „tell all‟.120   
                                                 
120 Vetenskapsrådet, 2002.  
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5. The Eastern Partnership 
 
The semistructured framework that guiding the interviews builds on the key concepts of the 
theoretical model presented in chapter 3.3. Yet, good interview questions require sound 
knowledge about the topic at hand. We need therefore increase our understanding of the policy 
that is to be examined: what is the Eastern Partnership and how does it fit into the EU‟s general 
foreign policy ambition to promote values?   
 
 
5.1 Setup and content of the Eastern Partnership 
When examining the EaP there are primarily two official documents to consider: the European 
Commission‟s communication on an Eastern Partnership and the heads of governments‟ Joint 
Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership from May 2009. Rather than giving a full summary 
of their content – the interested reader can easily access them herself – I here concentrate on the 
issue of values.121 The European Commission‟s take on the Eastern Partnership is certainly an 
ambitious one, stating that  
 
The EaP should bring a lasting political message of EU solidarity, alongside additional, tangible sup-
port for their [the Eastern neighbours] democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation 
of their statehood and territorial integrity. This serves the stability, security and prosperity of the EU, 
the partners and indeed the entire continent.122 
 
Directed towards the European Union‟s Eastern neighbours – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azer-
baijan, Armenia and Belarus – the EaP is presented as a response to challenges common to the 
entire continent. 123 Intended to serve as a concrete framework for cooperation it consists of two 
separate “tracks”. The ambition with the bilateral track is to create closer relations between the 
EU and each of the partner countries by initiating cooperation agreements with the ultimate aim 
of establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The provisions range 
from the upgrading of contractual relations towards association agreements to progressive visa 
liberalisation and support for economic and social policies. The multilateral track, in turn, is made 
up of four “policy platforms”: on democracy, good governance and stability; economic integra-
tion and convergence with EU policies; energy security and lastly contacts between people. These 
                                                 
121 For more information about the implementation and financing of the EaP, see European Commission 2009. 
122 European Commission, 2008, pp. 2-3 
123 EC, External Relations, Eastern Partnership. It can be noted that albeit formally included among the EaP 
countries, Belarus takes a somewhat special position. Besides from being the only partner country not fully covered 
by the ENP and lacking PCAs, the authoritarian nature of the Belarusian government make political ties highly 
complicated. All EU-Belarus relations are thus conducted on expert level.  
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provide a frame for handling challenges common to all neighbour countries and are additionally 
intended to, in a long term perspective, strengthen the relations among the partner countries 
themselves.124 
 
While acknowledging that all PCs share a common wish to deepen their relations with the EU, 
the Commission points out that they do not have identical objectives for doing so, nor are they 
identical in terms of democratic and/or economic development. If the EaP is to be a successful 
response to these countries‟ challenges it must take the different preconditions into considera-
tion. Aiming at more efficient means to do so than what is provided for in the already existing 
general ENP, the Commission stresses the importance of the fact that the EaP agreements will 
be “…tailored to each partner‟s specific situation and ambition”.125 The need for a differentiated ap-
proach is certainly a core feature of the Partnership given that the agreements are not merely tai-
lored to the individual countries‟ preconditions but that they also additionally will “…evolve ac-
cording to the EaP countries‟ level of ambition to comply to [sic] EU‟s standards.”126 In close 
connection to the principle of differentiation is thus the mechanism of conditionality: similarly to 
the enlargement context, the provisions of the EaP are linked to the partner countries‟ perform-
ances. Put simply: more ambitious countries will be rewarded with more integration than their 
less ambitious counterparts.127 
 
Hillion et al. claim that the EaP does provide added value to the EU‟s neighbourhood relations as 
it offers a more differentiated approach towards the Eastern countries. This fact however, raises 
questions about the future for the ENP. As they point out, the very promises of the EaP may 
(combined with the Union for the Mediterranean) render the ENP superfluous. Although it ap-
pears as if the Commission understands the EaP as a supplement rather than an alternative to the 
ENP, it remains an open question whether or not the ENP will survive as the overarching 
framework for EU-neighbourhood cooperation. 128 
                                                 
124 European Commission, 2008, p. 3 and the Council of the European Union, 2009, pp. 7-11. For an analysis of the 
content and potential problems with the two tracks, see Hillion et al, 2009, pp. 8-15.  
125 European Commission, 2008, p. 4. Emphasis added. See Michalski, 2009 and Hillion et al. 2009.  
126 Michalski, 2009, p. 3 For Ukraine which has repeatedly stated its ambition to join the EU, the EaP has from the 
beginning been perceived as an utterly bleak alternative to full EU-membership. According to Michalski, the 
possibility for to move forward irrespective of the development in the other participating countries was the main 
reason for the Ukrainian final decision to support the Partnership. See p. 5. 
127Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 5.  
128 European Commission, 2008, p. 3 and Hillion et al, 2009, pp. 22-24 
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5.1.1 Shared values?  
The extent to which the ambition to promote norms shaped the Eastern Partnership will be ex-
plored in the interviews. Nevertheless, it is obvious that values are an essential dimension of the 
EaP. In their joint declaration the EU member states‟ heads of governments state that the EaP  
 
…will be based on commitments to the principles of international law, and to fundamental values, in-
cluding democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, as well 
as to market economy, sustainable development and good governance.129 
 
The importance of respecting values such as democracy and human rights – and in extension the 
ambition to promote these very norms – is similarly signalised by the Commission‟s communica-
tion. The Commission clarifies that not only is the EaP based on “…mutual commitment” to the 
values just mentioned but that the “…level of ambition of the EU‟s relationship with the Eastern 
Partners will take into account the extent to which these values are reflected in national practices and 
policy implementation‖.130 Consequently, the acceptance of EU norms is made conditional to in-
creased EU-integration. Inspired by the enlargement experiences, the EaP employs the method-
ology of conditionality by offering incentives in return for partner countries‟ norm adoption and 
reforms. The difference is that the incentives offered in the EaP-context are deepened coopera-
tion agreements and the granting of support rather than EU-membership.  
  
The values in question are presented as shared values to which the EU member states and the 
partner countries are expected to be equally committed. This is furthermore linked to the issue of 
joint ownership:   
 
The Eastern Partnership is launched as a common endeavour of the Member States of the European 
Union and their Eastern European Partners…founded on mutual interests and commitments as well 
as on shared ownership and responsibility. It will be developed jointly, in a fully transparent man-
ner.131 
 
Although it is apparent that the EU wants to send the signal that the success of the partnership 
depends on the commitment of the member states and their Eastern European counterparts, it is 
less evident how the principle of joint ownership works in practice and, more specifically, how 
this guided the process of identifying the shared values. It can be questioned whether the values 
referred to as “shared values” are actually shared, in the sense of having been commonly defined, 
as opposed to defined by the EU alone. Several wordings indicate that the choice of values (de-
                                                 
129 Council of the European Union, 2009 
130 European Commission, 2008, p. 4. My emphasis. 
131 Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 5 
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mocracy, human rights etc.) was pre-defined rather than the result of negotiations. This is not least 
illustrated in the Commission‟s communication explicitly stating that  
 
A sufficient level of progress in terms of democracy, the rule of law and human rights and in particu-
lar evidence that the electoral legislative framework and practice are in compliance with international 
standards, and full cooperation with the Council of Europe, OSCE/ODIHR and UN human rights 
bodies will be a precondition for starting negotiations and for deepening relations thereafter”.132 
 
Moreover, the Commission promises that the partner countries will be assisted to meet the con-
ditions and commitments stemming from the cooperation agreements through a so called Com-
prehensive Institution Building programme developed with each country.133 This sends the im-
portant signal that the EU interprets the Partnership as a forum in which the EU and not the 
partner countries is in the position to define the preconditions for cooperation and judge the 
degree to which they are fulfilled. Hence, the obvious – but yet essential – conclusion is that the 
(EU-) principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights are a nonnegotiable foundation of 
the EaP. The EU does not intend to compromise about their content nor the commitment 
shown by the partner countries. This, in turn, makes it reasonable to question the extent to which 
the principle of joint ownership has in fact guided the development and setup of the Eastern 
Partnership and whether or not it will affect the future EaP-cooperation. As Kochenov succinctly 
points out there is dissonance between the concepts of conditionality and joint ownership:  
 
Simply put, either the partners are equal and own the process together, or, conditionality is employed 
by one of the partners, requiring that others be subject to compliance checks, while also being de-
pendent on the conditionality-related progress findings.134 
 
Finally, it might be tempting to interpret the focus on norms in the EaP as an indicator of milieu 
oriented objectives. Yet, it should be pointed out that promoting norms is not in itself evidence 
of a milieu oriented foreign policy. As discussed in chapter 3.2.3, the reasons for doing so can be 
possession oriented just as well. Without going too deep into the discussion about the motives 
behind the EaP, it can be noted that the EaP is presented with reference to both possession ori-
ented and milieu oriented goals. For example, increased EU security is mentioned in parallel to 
strengthening democratic reforms in the partner countries.135 Whether the officials involved in 
the Partnership-preparations understand the EaP as mainly milieu- or possession oriented will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
                                                 
132 European Commission, 2008, p. 4. Emphasis added. 
133 European Commission, 2008, p. 4 
134 Kochenov, 2009, pp. 16-17 
135 European Commission, 2008, pp. 2-3 
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6. Result: going into the black box of policy-making 
 
How is the issue of norm promotion and strategies for becoming a successful norm promoter perceived by the officials 
involved in the process of developing the Eastern Partnership? Aiming to answer the overarching question 
of this thesis, the current chapter links the officials‟ opinions to the key concepts of the 
theoretical model presented in 3.2.4. In the final section the model is evaluated and the civil 
servants‟ idea of the ideal strategy for norm promotion is presented. Yet, before addressing the 
main question, we will briefly explore the extent to which the distinction between technical and 
political bureaucrats helps to explain potential differences in the officials‟ reasoning. 
 
6.1 Political or technical bureaucrats?  
According to Beyers et al.‟s conclusions (discussed in 3.1.1), the technical officials of the European 
Commission can be expected to interpret their room for manoeuvre as more limited than the 
political civil servants representing the Swedish MFA. The interviews indicate that there is some 
truth to this image. All of the civil servants acknowledged that although the Commission 
“owned” the process of developing the proposal for an Eastern Partnership, its possibility to 
pursue an agenda of its own was (and generally tends to be) highly limited by the wills of the 
member states. The general opinion was that the member states define the framework for the 
Commission‟s work and that it before launching a proposal needs to be certain that it 
corresponds to the wishes of the EU member states – otherwise it will not fly. Despite this, the 
officials nevertheless interpreted the implications as regards their roles quite differently. Whereas 
the Swedish MFA officials seemed at ease talking about their own contribution to the EaP-
preparations, some of the EC representatives were more reluctant to do so, underlining that the 
Commission was asked to develop an initiative. By suggesting that they simply proposed what had 
been asked for, these officials seemed to want to describe their role in terms of the technical 
bureaucrat-ideal type.136 On the other hand, two of the EC officials expressed a clear sense of 
ownership, stating that because the European Commission “held the pen” in drafting the 
proposal it was only natural that they felt a sort of authorship.137 General opinions about how the 
Commission officials understand their task and degree of autonomy can therefore hardly be 
drawn. It is notable that the EC officials were cautious to talk about the content and even 
existence of the Commission‟s interest, underlining again that the insitution is assigned to develop 
                                                 
136 EC official 4, 5, SE MFA official 1, 2  
137 EC official 1, 3 
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and execute what the member states desire. Nonetheless, they did separate between the general 
EU–interest  on the one hand and the (aggregated) interests of the member states on the other. 
Hardly a surprise, the Swedish MFA representatives made a clear distinction between Swedish 
and EU-interests. 138  
 
The other division following from insitutional belonging concerned how the EaP is understood 
in relation to the umbrella policy of the ENP. Although the EC officials acknowledged the 
ambition to ameliorate the ENP (not least by adding a greater element of differentiation) as an 
important background to the launch of the EaP, it is apparent that they want the Partnership to 
be interpreted as an “…integral part of the European Neighbourhood Policy”.139 The EaP was 
repeatedly described as a complement and a “boost” rather than an alternative to the existing 
framework, and the EC civil servants kept referring to similarities between the policies‟ goals and 
setup.140 The Swedish MFA officials did not express any deviant opinions but the fact that the 
ENP was rarely mentioned and not at all emphasised indicates that from the Swedish point of 
view, the interrelation between the ENP and the EaP is less interesting. It was moreover evident 
that the Swedes are not overly content with the ENP, stating that the policy was good enough 
when first launched but that it has turned out an instrument too blunt to function satisfactory.141 
Given the apprehensions that the EaP and the Union for the Mediterranean might together 
render the ENP superflous, it is perhaps not surprising that the Commission – the “owner” of 
the ENP – emphasise the continous need for maintaining the policy. For Sweden on the other 
hand, the importance of doing so is perhaps less apparent.   
 
Overall, however, the dividing lines following the bureaucrats‟ institutional belonging were few 
and as regards strategies for norm promotion, no clear pattern could be deduced. As we will see 
further on, all of the officials appear to agree on the need for combining the consequentiality- and 
socialisation mechanisms. This implicates that Beyers et al.‟s conclusions are both strengthened 
and weakened or, put differently, that their argument is neither possible to confirm nor refuse. 
 
6.2 The objective of the Eastern Partnership   
As pointed out in chapter 3.2.3, understanding why certain strategies are preferred over 
alternative ones requires that the choice of strategy is linked to the overarching goal of the policy 
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at hand. Therefore, before directing attention to the issue of norm promotion, I will begin by 
discussing how the civil servants assigned to develop the Eastern Partnership conceive the 
intentions behind and objectives with the initiative.  
 
The issue of motives was often addressed with reference to two aspects: the political context and 
the policy content. Confirming the description given in chapter 5.1, the officials pointed at the 
widespread wish to ameliorate the ENP (and the, albeit less widespread desire to upgrade the 
EU‟s offer to the Eastern neighbours) together with the launch of the Union for the 
Mediterranean as the key factors rendering the EaP possible. The Polish-Swedish joint proposal 
was considered to have created the final push for the process to be initiated.142 The Swedish MFA 
officials moreover mentioned the will to facilitate future EU-membership as yet another 
important motive, underlining that the Swedish political leadership has since long expressed a 
clear appetite for extending the EU‟s offer to the Eastern neighbours.143   
 
As regards the policy substance, the officials described the will to integrate the six Eastern 
neighbours more closely to the EU as the main motive shaping the EaP-setup: the intention was 
to make a stronger and more attractive offer than what was possible through the ENP-
framework. When asked to elaborate why the EU seeks to enhance its engagement in the region 
the interviewees raised above all two aspects: the need for sending a clear(er) signal about the 
EU‟s commitment to the region and the ambition to support reform efforts. Stating that the 
policy preparations were guided by the goal of creating an “all-embracing” form of cooperation 
one of the Swedish MFA officials described the core of the EaP in the following manner:  
 
…the Partnership is not a Partnership à la carte in which the partner countries can choose to 
cooperate concerning energy and trade...this is a wide Partnership which includes also human rights, 
the rule of law, anti-corruption, reforming the legal system... You cannot simply choose what you 
want while leaving the rest aside.144 
 
Similar to this civil servant, several of the interviewees appeared to understand the EaP as a 
framework for influencing the internal development of the PCs – a framework through which 
best practices can be exchanged and reforms encouraged.145 Some, albeit not all, even made an 
explicit reference to the EU‟s overarching foreign policy goal to promote values, stating that the 
EaP is a forum for spreading values and a means for making sure that the countries develop in 
the desired direction – that they democratise and guarantee the respect for key principles such as 
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human rights and the rule of law.146 Encouraging the partner countries to become more 
integrated with the EU was generally perceived as the key instrument for the EU to support 
reform processes. The officials seemed to regard internal development as a natural effect of EU-
integration, something that might explain the emphasis put on the need for combining economic 
integration with integration in terms of values.147 Furthermore, even though the two processes 
were described as parallel and equally important, some of the officials‟ reasoning suggests that 
rapprochement in terms of values is considered more fundamental than economic integration. 
One of the Swedish MFA officials stated that drawing the partner countries closer to the EU is  
 
…not only about making them adopt as much of the trade acquis as possible. Rather, the big, or one 
of the big parts of the acquis we want them to adopt concerns human rights, democratic government, 
rule of law, market economy.148  
 
Correspondingly, one of the EC officials highlighted the crucial importance of including values, 
arguing that  
 
…the efforts to….essentially extend the acquis communautaire to other countries wouldn‟t be worth 
it or might prove unsustainable if there isn‟t an accompanied political process of democratisation, 
respect for human rights, rule of law, all these things that go under the banner of values.149  
 
Hence, even if economic development/integration without an equivalent progress in terms of 
values is objectively possible, this is not conceived as a plausible alternative within the EU-system. It is 
symptomatic that a majority of the interviewees were taken by surprise when asked to elaborate 
on the intentions behind including values in the Partnership; doing so was simply too self-evident 
to be questioned. Values were “fundamental” in the policy preparations and are the “foundation 
for the Eastern Partnership”.150 And, as one of the EC officials pointed out, the aim to promote 
values is not specific to the EaP but rather “…it is the policy of the EU in general to set 
preconditions for engaging with other countries…respect for common values, democracy and 
human rights, the rule of law.”151 This suggests that the ambition to spread EU values was the 
point of departure for the EaP-policy preparations. But was it the only motive? While recognising 
that all member states are keen to express their deep commitment to the value dimension 
rhetorically, the interviewees indicated that some member states are unwilling to make the 
necessary concessions when converting this commitment into practice. One of the EC civil 
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servants described it as a “…constant struggle because on the one hand you have the need to 
have a more realpolitik approach which is based on interest rather than values and on the 
other…there is this struggle for promoting values”.152 Although this particular civil servant 
claimed that the EaP-process was rather uncomplicated in this regard, some of the others seemed 
to think that the EaP preparations were (at least partly) marked by a tension between foreign 
policy goals and economic interests – or, put differently, milieu or possession oriented objectives. 
Whereas the value of the EaP was considered obvious from a foreign policy point of view, the 
fact that the economic benefits of enhanced commitment were deemed less evident rendered 
agreeing on the width and degree of ambition complicated. Should the value of increased political 
influence in the region be prioritised over (short term) economic interests or the other way 
around? The interviews suggest that this internal divide was present both in the member state 
context (between the MFAs and the Ministry of Finance) and within the European Commission 
itself (between the DG RELEX and DG Trade).153 To what extent did the tension affect the 
policy outcome? The Swedish MFA officials implied that they would have preferred an even 
more ambitious EaP, yet, the common opinion was that in the end, the political value of the EaP 
outweighed the economically motivated hesitations.154  
 
Given the above discussions, it seems reasonable to conclude that the civil servants conceive the 
Eastern Partnership as milieu rather than possession oriented. The goals of spreading values and 
contributing to the internal development in the PCs were emphasised much more frequently than 
was other potential goals. Whether the fact that the motive to advance EU-interests was not at all 
raised in the interviews means that it was objectively absent in the policy preparations or not is 
impossible to say. What we can assume, however, is that because the civil servants view spreading 
values as a core objective with the Partnership, the efficiency of strategies for norm promotion should 
have been a key determining factor in the policy preparations.  
 
 
6.3 Strategies for promoting values 
Addressing in turn the key concepts of assumptions, rationale, mechanisms and instruments, this 
section aims to answer the main question of how the officials involved in the EaP-policy preparations 
conceive strategies for norm promotion.  
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6.3.1 Assumptions  
Why do the officials believe that agents adopt new norms? The interviews suggest that the civil 
servants build on both constructivist and rationalist assumptions in their reasoning about motives 
for norm adoption. On the one hand, several of the interviewees gave expression to clearly 
rationalist ways of thinking, describing the process of norm compliance as a trade-off between 
costs and benefits. Pointing at the rationality of states and the short-term perspective of 
politicians, these officials argued that the EU must balance expected costs for adopting new 
norms with concrete benefits. Because politicians‟ future is on the short-term (e.g. the next 
election) they tend to regard the kind of long term benefits resulting from value adoption 
subordinate to the immediate costs of undergoing reforms and making concessions. Offering 
“concrete deliverables” is therefore considered necessary to raise the partner countries‟ interest in 
integrating with the EU and make adopting norms a more attractive and hence likely choice.155 
Moreover, the interviews indicate a tendency of linking the PCs‟ degree of receptiveness to their 
(mainly economic) needs. For example, one EC official put forth Azerbaijan as a particularly hard 
case when talking about the potential of the EaP becoming a successful forum for promoting 
values. Stressing the Azerbaijan richness of oil and gas resources, the official questioned the 
motives for and the extent to which Azerbaijan is really interested in integrating with Europe – 
they do not need Europe.156 The fact that this and other officials linked the needs of the target 
country to the interest in integration indicates that the reward is assumed to be the main motivator 
behind norm adoption. Yet another EC official seemed to suggest that the Commission in 
general builds on rationalist understandings of what motivates change. Commenting on the 
implications of not including the membership perspective in the EaP, the official stated that  
 
Of course you can always argue that if they [the partner countries] would have an accession 
perspective then their collaboration would be better but this is something that is decided by the heads 
of states and not the Commission.157  
 
Albeit not explicitly spelled out, the quote indicates a conviction that including the membership 
perspective would have rendered the EaP more effective. This, in turn, suggests that the official 
believes that agents change because they see benefits with doing so.  
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On the other hand, there were also clear indicators of constructivist assumptions. For example, 
both of the Swedish MFA officials linked the receptiveness of the PCs to their internal identity. 
According to them, the strong sense of “Europeanness” in many of these countries infers that 
they are more likely to change and adopt norms when doing so is perceived as strengthening their 
European identity.158 Likewise, several of the officials underlined that the EU cannot impose 
values: the will to change and to adopt new norms must come from within.159 As one of the EC 
representatives formulated it:  
 
…either you are convinced or you are not convinced. I mean, there is not something that we can do a 
lot to change. (…) this is not something the EU can impose, it has to come from within and, basically, 
the only thing we can offer is the example of Europe.160 
 
Particularly, the necessity of reforms being driven from within was raised with reference to 
sustainability. All of the interviewees evidently believed that forced reform does not last.161 Confirming 
the understanding of norm adoption as a result of internal processes rather than external 
impositions, one of the Swedish MFA officials argued that the EU should   
 
…implant values not on official political level but in the society. This is done through contacts 
between students and scholar exchanges…these things are equally important. It doesn‟t have to be 
activities with an explicit political purpose; it is just about exposing these countries for our values.162 
 
The emphasis on the target countries‟ willingness to change together with the fact that exposing 
them to the EU core values is considered a potential efficient means for promoting norms 
suggest that the officials build on constructivist assumptions about why and how agents adopt 
new norms. Additionally, the general expectation among all officials (even the more rationalism-
oriented ones) was that the EaP would be a successful framework for norm promotion in the long 
term. Value adoption was more frequently stressed as an effect of slow processes of socialisation, 
habituation and internalisation rather than the result of interest-maximising and cost-benefit 
calculations. Thus, while the officials assume that the target countries are rational in the sense 
that they tend to balance the expected benefits of adopting norms against the expected costs for 
doing so, they appear to consider the impact of this balancing subordinate to the identity-based 
receptiveness of the state in question. This indicates that they regard the ideas and perceptions of 
the partner countries as the key determining factors: agents will not adopt new norms unless they 
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are convinced. The conclusion is thus that constructivist assumptions appear to play a more 
fundamental role than rationalist ones.  
 
6.3.2 Rationale  
How do the civil servants perceive the rationale of the norm adoption process? It is clear that all 
of the interviewees regard the logic of consequence crucially important when promoting norms, 
not least because offering incentives in return for rule/value adoption proved so efficient in the 
pre-accession negotiations. For this reason, the policy-preparations were guided by an ambition 
to make use of previous experiences and transpose the enlargement methods to fit the EaP-
framework. As one EC official noted “…we feel that even without offering membership there is 
still quite a lot into it”.163 The interviews indicate wide agreement about countries tending to 
become more willing to make the necessary sacrifices involved in adopting new norms if/when 
offered concrete benefits for doing so. One EC official described this in the following manner:  
 
…I‟m not really sure whether they are willing to adopt these norms; they say that they are and they 
adopt them to a certain degree because they want to get the fruits of the economic dimension of the 
EaP…this motivates them a little bit to make also concessions on the human rights and good 
governance component.164 
 
Claiming that the concrete benefits rather than the values as such are what motivate norm 
adoption, the official expresses a belief in the promise of invoking the logic of consequence – a 
belief that seems to be shared several of the interviewees. For example, another EC official 
argued that  
 
…there needs to be progress in values but we need incentives also to… basically to indicate to them 
[the PCs] that by integrating more in Europe they are also going to have concrete benefits.165 
 
While suggesting that progress in terms of values is the (implicit) main goal of integration, this 
official suggests that in order for the PCs to be(come) willing to work towards this goal, they need also 
see concrete benefits with doing so. Moreover, many referred to offering incentives as a means to 
manipulate the trade-off between long-term goals and short-term sacrifices. Given the indicators 
of the logic of consequence-rationale, it should perhaps come as no surprise that there is a clear 
element of linking norm adherence to the provision of incentives in the Partnership. As one of 
the officials summarised it: “How well you live up to the EU‟s expectations affects the concrete 
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support, the concrete economic assistance”.166 Concurrently, the interviews indicate that the 
officials see important limitations to the usefulness and potential of the logic of consequence in 
the EaP-context. They underlined that its effectiveness essentially depends on the extent to 
which the incentives offered are considered attractive enough; a factor highly dependent on the 
context in and ambitions of the target country. For this reason, it was widely agreed that whereas 
invoking the logic of consequence can be expected efficient in the PCs for which the incentives 
are right, it may be inoperative or even counterproductive for others.167 
 
Additionally, several of the interviewees pointed at the importance of changing mentalities in the 
society as a whole in order to create the fundaments for change – as opposed to solely promoting 
change as such. There was a clear sense that, pushed to discuss democracy, human rights etc. the 
PCs will become habituated with and eventually more receptive for the promoted values. In this 
regard, the Civil Society Forum was described as particularly promising, providing a framework 
for socialisation and network-creation.168 This suggests that also a strong belief in the logic of 
appropriateness-rationale guided the policy choices. Furthermore, the fact that two of the 
officials argued explicitly for directing norm promoting efforts towards the administrative level 
indicates that the ambition to invoke such a rationale shaped the policy choices.169 One of the 
Swedish MFA stated that: 
 
….above all, it‟s about gaining access to the civil servants…we believe in injecting inspiration and 
ideas about change in the administration. For these ideas to work inside the current political system, 
fostering change from within.170   
 
This tells us two things. First, by pointing at the administration as a target, the interviewees 
recognise that the PC officials do in fact influence the political development. Not only does this 
mean that they acknowledge also their own power over the political process (confirming thereby 
the relevance of this study). It moreover infers that, in the long term perspective, changing the 
officials‟ ideas and conceptions about key values is equally or even more important to converting 
the minds of the often short-term appointed and therefore short-sighted political leaders. Second, 
it is evident that they follow the logic of appropriateness in their understanding of the value 
adoption-process as a result of mentality-changes and identification rather than (solely) cost-
benefit calculations. As noted by the official quoted above this is however 
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…not really something one can write in a paper (…) but the choice to involve these countries‟ 
administrations on a fairly technical level in order to foster an awareness, for them to be acquainted 
with how the EU works…that is a foundation pillar. I guess that‟s how we reasoned about it.171 
 
All interviewees expressed similar opinions; the other Swedish MFA official noting that the 
importance of altering ideas was assumed rather than discussed in preparing the EaP.172 This 
means that the extent to which the two rationales are explicitly reflected in the EaP-documents 
should not be interpreted in terms of strong/weak support for the logic of consequence versus 
the logic of appropriateness. I argue that it rather should be seen as an expression for the fact 
that the officials appear to understand the role and the meaning of the two rationales quite 
differently. There was a clear tendency of the logic of consequence being linked to the more 
instrumental/strategic dimensions of the EaP (e.g. how to provoke concrete change). The belief 
in the logic of appropriateness-rationale on the other hand, seems to have served as (the given) 
point of departure, impregnating the officials‟ reasoning about the contexts in and the 
mechanisms through which norms are adopted. Put differently: while the effectiveness of the 
former was object for discussion, the importance of the latter was taken for granted. The 
conclusion is thus that the officials do not perceive the rationales of the logic of consequence and 
the logic of appropriateness as alternative or conflicting. Rather, they regard them as 
complementary. How this affects their conclusions about mechanisms and instruments for 
promoting values is the question to which we now turn.  
 
6.3.3 Mechanisms and instruments  
As could be expected given the discussions above, the interviews suggest that the EaP-
preparations were guided by an ambition to combine the mechanisms and instruments of the 
external incentives- and the social learning model respectively. The mechanism of socialisation 
was frequently referred to as a crucial factor when promoting values, seeminlgy understood as 
creating the foundation for norms to be adopted. The general expectation seems to be that if the 
partner countries are continuosly exposed to the values the EU seeks to spread, they will become 
habituated with them and eventually come to regard them as natural. In the long term 
perspective, the hope is that this will result in value internalisation.173 Acknowedging that the 
ambition to foster socialisation processes shaped the EaP-policy choices, one EC official 
described the intentions and approach in the following manner. The EaP provides   
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...some ways of creating networks for socialisation among these countries and the EU that we hope 
can in the longer term lead also to adoption of these values, to change in the mentalities, socialisation, 
to foster socialisation process. (…) This can help them, inspire them to reform…based on the model 
of others. That‟s the whole idea.174 
 
Similarly, many expressed hopes that the Civil Society Forum will facilitate network-creation and 
value- as well as rule rapprochement, explicitly linking it to the concept of socialisation. Although 
the officials mainly argued for the persuasion-instrument, particularly the Swedish MFA officials 
expressed support for making use also of the social pressure-instrument. Pointing out that the 
PCs have publicly declared their commitment to the shared values underpinning the EaP by 
signing the joint declaration, one of them described this as an indispensable source of influence:   
 
…in every pledge they make in high level political contexts [about their commitment to the shared 
values] they expose themselves to a considerable risk of being conceived as failing to live up to the 
declared commitments. And we believe in the philosophy of naming and shaming (…) I mean, it is 
the absolutely worst thing that can happen; that you participate in a fancy meeting, invited, and 
someone openly criticises you.175 
 
Because these countries want to be perceived as members of the EU-club and because political 
leaders generally wish to avoid negative attention, they are sensitive for criticism. Thus, by 
drawing attention to discrepancies between their (self-declared) theory and practice, the EU can 
pressurise the target countries to improve. Yet, it was also emphasised that the potential of 
socialisation mechanisms depends on the partner country‟s degree of receptiveness. Whereas 
fostering socialisation processes was put forth as a promising strategy in the Ukrainian context 
(which‟s strong sense of Europeanness together with its explicitly declared ambition to join the 
EU makes it fairly receptive) the officials expressed doubts about its potential in the less EU-
oriented Azerbaijan (which, because it does not identify with Europe to the same extent that does 
Ukraine was considered substantially less receptive).176 
Notwithstanding the strong support for fostering socialisation, it is apparent that the officials 
believe also in the consequentiality mechanism and the potential of incentives. One EC official 
argued that because politicians – who are the ones best positioned to initiate real change – tend 
to be short-sighted they generally find it hard to see the value with long term benefits. And even 
if they do, they tend to be reluctant to make the short-term sacrifices necessary to obtain it. 
Incentives in the form of “concrete deliverables” are thus needed to manipulate the trade-off 
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between short-term costs and long-term benefits.177 One of the Swedish MFA officials expressed 
a similar opinion when talking about the concrete EAP-setup, stating that because EU-values are 
the foundation of the partnership “…any lapse from respecting them must have consequences. 
How to do this, in what stage backlashes should lead to consequences (…) is something that we 
must continuously discuss”.178 This indicates that the conditionality-mechanism both is and is 
understood as a core feature of the value promoting-dimension of the Partnership. Interestingly 
enough, although some of the interviewees referred to the idea of sticks and carrots as 
underpinning the EaP, incentives were clearly interpreted in terms of carrots. Only one of the 
officials openly reflected on the possibility of using negative incentives, albeit concluding in the 
end that since the EaP builds on voluntariness and joint ownership, employing sticks would send 
the wrong signals and even risk undermine rather than support the attempts to promote values.179   
 
The interviews indicate that using incentives is regarded utterly efficient. Yet, similarly to their 
reasoning about the potential of the socialisation-mechanism, it is evident that the officials see 
important limitations also to the consequentiality-approach. All of the interviewees pointed out 
that though this logic has proved efficient before, it is by no means a guarantee to success. First, 
in order for conditionality to be effective it is crucial that the EU is “…coherent in withholding 
those carrots if the countries do not reach the necessary conditions”, or it will undermine its own 
influence.180 Recognising the potentially diverging interests of the member states, the officials 
described obtaining coherence as utterly difficult. Second, the ambiguity of the EaP (neither 
offering nor ruling out future EU-membership) was put forth as a challenge: the uncertainty about 
the desired nature of future EU-PC relations risks to weaken the link between efforts and 
incentives.181 Third, the civil servants strongly emphasised that conditionality requires that the 
right incentives are offered: less attractive carrots will result in less ambitious/willing target 
countries. This “rightness”, in turn, is contextually determined. Describing the EaP-incentives as 
“fairly weak”, one of the Swedish MFA representatives took the issue of aerial cooperation to 
illustrate her point. If cooperating on rules for air service is considered beneficial then the offer 
to increase it will be a powerful incentive. If the target country instead seeks to secure the 
interests of their national airlines, then increased cooperation will have the rather opposite 
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effect.182 Although this official went farthest in her critique of the EaP-incentives, all of the 
interviewees underlined the essential importance of taking the context-dependency into account 
when developing a strategy for norm promotion.183 The officials pointed out that although the 
EU can influence the development by increasing the willingness to reform (though offering incentives 
and foster processes of identification) the EU cannot impose change – the will to reform must 
come from within. Thus, the officials perceive the EaP as a potentially powerful tool for value 
promotion irrespective of the strategy chosen as long as the partner countries are rhetorically and 
practically committed to the EaP-visions.184 
 
Given the above discussions, what can be concluded about the officials‟ understanding of 
instruments for spreading values? It is clear that neither offering incentives nor fostering 
socialisation is regarded unambiguously efficient. Rather, the strategies‟ potential effectiveness is 
considered dependent on the relation between the incentives/identity offered on the one hand 
and the context/ambitions of the target state on the other. The socialisation mechanism will only 
work if and when the target is already interested in and identify with the EU. The effectiveness of the 
consequentiality mechanism, in turn, depends on the attractiveness of the incentives offered and 
the EU‟s ability to hold the line. Moreover, confirming Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier‟s notion 
that rule adoption motivated solely by benefits tend to be less sustainable than norms adopted 
through a combination of the socialisation- and consequentialy mechanisms, several of the 
officials argued that offering incentives without persuading the targets about the norms‟ goodness 
risked resulting in lip-service adoption rather than true internalisation of values.185 Because of 
these limitations, none of the strategies was deemed sufficient in itself : accomplishing true and 
sustainable value adoption requires both the methods of offering incentives and fostering 
socialisation. That the officals regard combining the strategies of external incentives and social 
learning the ideal approach did not least become evident in the end part of the interviews when  
they were asked to elaborate on the key of becoming a successful value promoter. All of them 
made explicit references to both dimensions of the theoretical model, arguing for providing 
incentives and encourage socialisation. Finally, when seeking to explain the sucess of enlargement 
in terms of value promotion, one of the EC officials captured what appears to be understood as 
the foundation for and the core of the EU‟s norm promoting-ability. The key to success  
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…is the success of the model and the power of attraction of the EU and that, I think is first in terms of 
respect of the various identities of the EU members…be that national identities, regional identities, 
minority identities, I think we‟ve got that in the EU. The fact that everybody contributes and counts in the 
EU is a striking difference in relation to what they had under the communist or the Soviet system. Of 
course, the fact that economically it has been successful and that there are some mechanisms to promote 
economic solidarity between states, I think that is also important.186 
 
Essentially, the European Unions potential as a norm promoter is considered intimatedly linked 
to its perceived attractiveness – in ideational and economic terms. As long as this attractiveness is 
maintained, the EU will continue to be influential in the countries which identify with and aim to 
gain access to the economic dimensions of the Union.  
 
6.4 Putting it together: how are strategies for norm promotion conceived in 
the internal process of policy-making?  
Returning to the specific research questions presented in chapter 1.4, it can be concluded that the 
officials interpret the Eastern Partnership as milieu- rather than possession oriented and that the 
ambition to spread values underpins the policy setup. Linking their reasoning to the key concepts 
of the theoretical model elaborated in 3.2.4 made clear that they find both the strategy of external 
incentives and social learning relevant. The theoretical model helped elucidate the core 
dimensions of how the officials understand motives for adopting norms as well as the logic 
behind the concrete way of action: though the EC and the Swedish MFA representatives build on 
rationalist and constructivist assumptions about what provokes change, the constructivist ways of 
thinking appears to weigh heavier. The general opinion was that the EU‟s potential source of 
influence lies in its ability to increase the likeliness for value adoption by making it a more 
attractive choice. It was strongly and repeatedly emphasised that the EU cannot impose change: 
agents will not adopt norms unless they are convinced of their benefits and inherent goodness. 
Concerning the concrete strategies, it is apparent that the civil servants consider both external 
incentives and social learning valuable. Aiming to invoke the logic of consequence- and the logic 
of appropriateness-rationales, the policy choices appear to have been guided by an ambition to 
promote norms through both the consequentiality and socialisation mechanism. The civil 
servants argued for the need and potential of offering incentives as well as persuade and 
(publicly) pressurise the partner countries to adopt the EU-core values. Finally, although all 
officials acknowledged the EU‟s ability to make the target states more receptive, there was wide 
                                                 
186 EC official 2 
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agreement that in the end, the context and ambitions of the norm recipient are the key 
determinants for the Union‟s potential influence.  
 
Hence, the overarching question of this thesis – how is the issue of norm promotion and strategies for 
becoming a successful norm promoter conceived in the internal policy-making process of the EU? – can be 
answered in the following manner: The civil servants involved in the policy preparations 
understand norm promotion as a core dimension of the milieu oriented Eastern Partnership. 
Supporting the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness, they consider both the 
model of external incentives and social learning relevant. The ideal strategy for becoming a 
successful norm promoter is therefore one that takes into account the context of the target state 
and which combines the mechanisms and instruments of consequentiality and socialisation.  
 
One additional ambition in this thesis was to explore potential differences between how values 
are framed in the EaP-documents and how promoting these values are conceived by the civil 
servants assigned to prepare the policy. The picture of how the EU seeks to promote values is 
considerably more “flat” and univocal in the official documents than when elaborated by the 
officials. This is hardly surprising: conceptions do tend to be complex rather than perfectly 
coherent. Yet, the comparison indicates that some aspects of their understandings of the process 
of norm promotion/adoption are so taken for granted that they are rarely discussed and even 
more rarely written down. Above all, constructivist assumptions about motives for adopting new 
norms appear to have been crucial in the policy preparations – a fact hardly visible in the official 
documents. That there are additional dimensions to the EU‟s attempts to promote values than 
what is explicitly spelled out is important to bear in mind when considering all EU-policies. The 
main finding, however, is that the officials conceive the strategies of external incentives and social 
learning as complementary rather than alternative. This means that some adjustments of the 
theoretical model are called for.    
6.4.1 Evaluating the theoretical model  
Naturally, a theoretical model consists of ideal types and will therefore never give a perfect 
description of reality. For this reason and as previously pointed out, the expectation was not that 
the conceptions held by the civil servants would be possible to conceptualise solely in terms of 
the external incentives model or the social learning model. Rather, the aim with the model was to 
elucidate key aspects and logical links in the officials‟ reasoning. The discussions above indicate 
that the model is a good foundation for understanding how the officials of the Swedish MFA and 
the European Commission perceive strategies for norm promotion. However, there are two 
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aspects that the model does not account for. First, in presenting the two strategies as alternative, 
it does not consider the interplay between them. Reluctant to choose between the strategies of 
external incentives and social learning, the officials emphasised the potential of and even need for 
combining the consequentiality and socialisation mechanisms. Albeit not explicitly spelled out, 
they appear to understand norm promotion (and adoption) as a process divided into different 
stages. Because theses stages require different approaches to maintain and strengthen the target 
states‟ interest in and receptiveness for the promoted values, the officials argued for offering 
incentives and persuading/pressurising them to change. Second, it does not acknowledge the 
important aspect of context-dependency. It was repeatedly and strongly underlined that any 
strategy for norm promotion must consider the needs and ambitions of the target: there is no 
such thing as a strategy universally applicable. The conclusion is thus that the theoretical model 
should be complemented to account also for the context-dependency of and interplay between 
strategies.  
 
6.4.2 The ideal strategy for norm promotion: combining socialisation and 
incentives 
As discussed above, the officials regard combining and making use of the interplay between the 
strategies of external incentives and social learning as keys in becoming a successful value 
promoter. But how do they conceive the nature of this interplay? The interviews suggest that 
value promotion is interpreted as a process divided into stages, each of these stages requiring 
different approaches.187 First, the target‟s interest must be raised in order for its receptiveness for 
external influence and the promoted norms to be increased. Second, this receptiveness must be 
maintained and strengthened. Third, the norm promoter must help the target over the “edge”, 
making adopting the promoted values attractive enough to outweigh potential costs by adding a 
final boost. The requirements of the different stages infer that the norm promoter cannot rely 
solely on one of the strategies: it must make use of different mechanisms and instruments. Figure 
3 illustrates how the civil servants understand the optimal interplay between the strategies of 
external incentives and social learning:  
 
                                                 
187 It should be noted that the focus here lies on norm promotion directed towards states – how to affect ideas of the 
political opposition and/or the civil society is in other words not considered. Examining the relation between 
requirements and target for the norm promoting efforts is however an important task for future studies.  
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Figure 3: The ideal strategy for norm promotion 
 
As indicated by figure 3, the first step is to offer incentives. Although some degree of 
identification with/interest in the EU is considered a precondition for value promotion to be 
possible, identification alone is not regarded a sufficient motivator. The norm promoter must 
therefore raise the target‟s interest by offering incentives, increasing thereby its receptiveness for 
the promoted values. Once interest has been established, it must be maintained and supported. 
Thus, fostering and engaging in socialisation is perceived as the next necessary step. Through 
including the political leaders and bureaucrats of the target state in contexts where the promoted 
values condition the cooperation, the promoter can argue for and persuade the target about their 
universal goodness. The more the target-representatives participate in these meetings, the more 
they get used to the “European” way of seeing things and the more likely it becomes that they 
adopt and finally internalise the promoted values. Moreover, by making use of the social pressure 
instruments, naming and shaming the agents that do not live up to the standards set, non-
compliance is rendered even less attractive. However, because reforming and adopting values to 
the extent desired and requested by the norm promoter tends to be extremely costly (in terms of 
time and financial resources as well as political capital) an extra boost is deemed needed. In order 
to push the target over the final edge, the third stage requires that incentives are offered once 
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again. Complementing the socialisation-process, the norm promoter can make adopting new 
norms an even more attractive choice by balancing the costs of adoption with concrete benefits.   
 
Although it is evident that the interviewees perceive the interplay between external incentives and 
social learning as the key aspect of norm promotion, an additional conclusion is that there is no 
strategy universally applicable nor can there be one. What emphasis should be put on the 
different instruments as well as their optimal content is highly dependent on the needs and 
ambitions of the target. Furthermore, also the abilities and ambitions of the norm promoter must 
be acknowledged as they define the frames for what strategies are liable. Because contextual 
factors are of crucial importance, the norm promoter‟s strategy must necessarily allow for a 
certain degree of pragmatism in order to be effectual. For this reason, also the dimension of 
context-dependency has been included in figure 3. Yet, “context-dependency” is a very broad 
concept which tells us little about the relation between contexts on the one hand and strategies 
on the other. To what extent does the context affect the potential of different strategies and are 
there some factors that are more important than others? Since these aspects were not included in 
the theoretical model, they were explored only to a very limited extent in the interviews. The 
degree to which and how the dimension of context-dependency affect the process of norm 
promotion/adoption is therefore something that should be explored in future research. Figure 4 
illustrates the interaction between the contextual factors put forth by the interviewed officials. As 
such, it lays the foundation for future studies.    
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Figure 4: Contextual factors affecting the processof norm promotion/compliance 
 
Figure 4 suggests that both the process of promoting and adopting norms is context-dependent. 
Acknowledging the context of the value promoter and the context of the target for norm 
promotion, a number of factors are considered to affect these processes. From the norm 
promoter‟s view, the internal capacities in terms of financial and political resources as well as the 
balance between milieu and possession oriented foreign policy objectives are determining factors. 
For the target it is above all its degree of identification with the norm promoter together with the 
(mainly economic) needs and general foreign policy goals that are aspects of extra importance. 
The dynamics of the international system – and particularly other potential norm promoters – 
affect both the promoter and recipient agent. The main conclusion to be drawn from figure 4, 
however, is that contextucal factors are key determinants because they affect the degree to which the 
promoter/target is committed to/receptive for value promotion. 
 
This thesis set out to examine how strategies for norm promotion are conceived in the internal 
policy-making system of the European Union. The interviews have increased our knowledge 
about how the officials assigned to put the EU‟s political goal of spreading values into policy 
practice understand the motives behind and mechanisms in adopting new norms. We have also 
elaborated our understanding of how instruments for norm promotion are perceived; the main 
PROCESS OF NORM PROMOTION/ADOPTION 
Norm 
promoter 
Target for norm 
promotion 
Foreign 
policy goals 
Balance between 
milieu- and 
possession goals 
Needs 
Financial and 
political resources 
(financial, political) 
Degree of 
identification 
with the norm 
promoter 
The international 
system (alternative 
norm promoters) 
Degree of 
receptiveness 
Degree of 
commitment to 
norm promotion 
CONTEXTUAL 
FACTORS 
Actors Result 
  
  67 
   
 
conclusion being that they are regarded complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than 
alternative. Promoting norms is interpreted as a process divided into stages requiring different 
approaches: being pragmatic is therefore a necessity. Hence, according to the officials, the ideal 
strategy for promoting norms is one which acknowledges the requirements of the process‟ 
different stages, takes into account the issue of context-dependency and which combines offering 
incentives with fostering socialisation. 
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7. Conclusions 
With the European Union‟s much repeated ambition to be(come) a value-based global actor as 
point of departure, this thesis set out to explore how the norm-promoter EU understand 
strategies for norm promotion. Pointing at the administration‟s key role in policy-making, I 
argued that a full understanding of the dynamics of norm promotion requires taking into account 
the conceptions held by the civil servants assigned to translate the political goal of spreading 
values into policy practice. So, what are the lessons from going in to the black box of policy-
making?  
 
First and foremost, the result suggests that there are good reasons for considering the 
conceptions held by civil servants – the need for doing so was even explicitly confirmed by the 
interviewees themselves. By describing the recipient states‟ officials as promising – or even crucial 
– targets for norm promoting efforts, they recognised all civil servants‟ potential impact on 
policy-making. The main reason, however, is the discovered breach between theorists‟ and policy-
makers‟ understanding of norm promoting strategies. The interviewed officials emphasised other 
aspects than does the academic literature. It is evident that, contrary to the general theoretical 
understanding, the officials do not interpret the external incentives- and the social learning 
models as alternative. Instead, they are regarded complementary and mutually reinforcing. Incentives 
must be supported by socialisation-processes in order for value adoption to be sustainable, and 
socialisation must be complemented by incentives in order for the targets to be(come) willing to 
make the necessary concessions. Admittedly, the literature does recognise the possibility of more 
than one factor motivating norm adoption. Yet, the interplay between socialisation and 
consequentiality is generally treated as just a possibility rather than a potentially essential 
component of the process. Even though this study‟s design does not allow for any general 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the strategies‟ empirical effectiveness, the discrepancy 
between the officials‟ and the literature‟s assessments nonetheless indicates that previous research 
may have underestimated the importance of this interplay. Investigating the interrelation between 
and the extent to which the mechanisms affect each other is therefore an important task for 
future studies. Figure 3 (presented in 6.5.2) offers an alternative understanding of the process of 
norm promotion and can therefore serve as starting point for such an attempt. 
 
However, the result also supports the argument for examining civil servants‟ perceptions 
irrespective of the objective accuracy of their conclusions. As pointed out in the introduction, officials do 
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not merely execute what they have been assigned to do – their conceptions form the foundation 
for and guide the policy choices. To a large degree, it is how they conceive the motivations and 
mechanisms behind value adoption that determines the norm promoter‟s final choice of strategy. 
The discovered breach discussed above confirms that we can hardly understand the dynamics of 
norm promotion by solely looking at theoretical conceptualisations and assessments of different 
strategies‟ effectiveness. Consequently, this study‟s findings are important also from an empirical 
point of view; increasing our understanding of how the relevance of and the strategies for norm 
promotion is perceived in EU-policy-making. In extension, this makes us better equipped to 
understand the EU as a norm promoter in general.   
 
The question is thus if the result provides any new empirical insights in this regard? The 
interviews show that the EC and Swedish MFA officials all understand and handled norm 
promotion as a core objective when developing the EaP. When asked about the motives for 
including values, the interviewees were taken aback: the goodness of EU-values as well as the 
importance of spreading them appears to be so taken for granted that including them was self-
evident. In some sense, this was quite expected. The very essence of norms (their taken-for-
granted-character discussed in chapter 4.2) infers that they are rarely or never reflected upon. Yet, 
the fact that the officials actually do describe the Partnership as a norm promoting instrument is 
essential since it indicates that the officially declared ambition to spread values is more than just 
rhetoric. Returning to one of the issues raised in the introduction – to what extent are the 
declared goals perceived as de facto goals – it can in other words be concluded that there is 
accordance between the political ambitions and policy practice. Hence, from a societal point of 
view the perhaps most important finding is that the high-toned spreading values-objective is 
strongly reflected also in the EU-administration.  
 
Another important lesson concerns the motives for promoting norms. The result suggests that 
norm promoters are less “single-tracked” than described by the academic literature, motivated by 
other aspects than merely achieving the quickest change possible. Above all, the ambition to 
promote sustainable value adoption seems to be considered a key factor guiding the policy choices. 
This contrasts with the approach taken in previous research in which there is a clear tendency of 
picturing the (measurable) effectiveness as norm promoters‟ main goal. Given that this finding 
supports both the claimed link between norm promotion and milieu oriented foreign policy 
goals; and the normative power Europe-thesis it is important from a theoretical as well as 
empirical point of view. 
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Going into the black box of EU-policy-making we have increased our understanding of the 
dynamics of norm promotion in general and the European Union as a norm promoter in 
particular. Civil servants are key actors in the policy process and their conceptions should 
therefore receive more attention in future research. I argue that doing so is particularly important 
in the context of EU-norm promotion: proven efficient, the efforts to spread values will affect 
not only the citizens of the Union but (potentially) have ideational impact in the whole of 
Europe. 
 
7.1. The way forward? Suggestions for further research 
Although this thesis has advanced our understanding of how norm promoters view strategies for 
spreading values, the result indicates that fully understanding how and why norms are promoted 
(and adopted) requires that we increase our knowledge about 1) the interplay between strategies and 2) 
the interplay between strategies and contexts. As pointed out above, previous research does recognise 
that norm adoption can be the result of incentives- and socialisation-based strategies, but this has 
been stated as a fact rather than been explored. Therefore, examining the objective accuracy of 
this description as well as the extent to which the different instruments are needed are important 
tasks for future research. The officials‟ understanding of the norm promoting process presented 
in figure 3 can serve as point of departure for such an attempt.   
 
Moreover, although much international relations-theory point at the issue of context-dependency, 
its importance has (similarly to how the interrelation between strategies has been treated) been 
noted rather than investigated. Additionally, because of the tendency to focus on norm 
compliance rather than norm promotion, contextual factors have mainly been discussed in 
hindsight when seeking to explain why a certain rule was adopted. The result of this thesis 
suggests that the degree of influence and nature of the issue of context-dependency should be 
further explored. Figure 4 lays the foundation for future studies by pointing at some contextual 
factors affecting the process of norm promotion/adoption. 
 
7.2 Final reflections  
In laying out the empirical framework of this thesis, I argued that fully understanding the 
significance of enlargement, the ENP and now also the EaP requires considering the EU‟s 
general foreign policy-abilities. The restrictions within the CFSP-area (discussed in chapter 2.1.2) 
renders the EU‟s potential of becoming the globally important actor it aspires to be highly 
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limited. It is symptomatic that the Union has turned out most successful in fulfilling its foreign 
policy-objectives through policies not formally part of the CFSP. The policies just mentioned are 
therefore essential not only from a regional-security point of view: providing the EU with 
alternative forums and instruments they can in fact be interpreted as means to side-step the 
limitations of the EU‟s room for manoeuvre in foreign affairs.  
 
Verifying the conclusions drawn in previous research, this study shows that the European 
Union‟s potential impact is considered intimately linked to its perceived attractiveness. Thus, as 
long as the EU-model is considered ideationally and economically appealing, its source of 
influence can be expected to be maintained. Yet, in order to make use of this potential impact, 
there must be a framework within which the EU can communicate and cooperate with target 
states. Given the dim future for further enlargements and the perceived limitations of the ENP it 
is therefore essential also for the EU‟s general foreign policy aspirations that the Eastern 
Partnership turns out successful. 
 
This thesis suggests that value promotion is a core dimension of the Eastern Partnership. But why 
does the EU seek to spread values? From an idealist point of view, the emphasis on values and 
internal development can be interpreted as an expression for milieu-oriented foreign policy 
objectives: the motive for engaging in the neighbour countries is simply that the EU wants to be 
a force for good; expanding the zone of prosperity. Notwithstanding this, a more subtle 
interpretation is that norm promotion is a means of expanding the Union‟s zone of influence. Not 
merely focusing on the actual development but aiming to change what is conceived as normal 
enables the EU to increase its impact also in a long term perspective. Spreading values is 
essentially about convincing others of the universal goodness and superiority of ones own ways 
of thinking. Whether or not the EaP turns out successful in this regard remains an issue to be 
seen. The main conclusion, however, is that its potential impact should be not be underestimated. 
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Summary 
 
The issues of norm promotion and compliance have been addressed by a number of scholars. 
Similarly, many have sought to explore the European Union‟s ambition to spread its core values. 
Yet, previous research has failed to consider the crucial importance of the officials assigned to 
put the political goal of promoting values into policy practice. With this gap as point of departure 
and focusing on the EU‟s newest foreign policy tool, the Eastern Partnership, this thesis aims to 
elaborate our understanding of how strategies for norm promotion are conceived in EU-policy-
making. Employing a theoretical model of two strategies for norm promotion (the external 
incentives- and social-learning model) as framework for analysis, I investigate what assumptions 
and logics guided the policy choices. Interviews with officials representing the European 
Commission and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs show a clear breach between their and 
the literature‟s understanding of strategies for promoting norms. Contrary to the general image, 
they consider the strategies of external incentives and social learning complementary and mutually 
reinforcing rather than alternative. Norm promotion is seen as a context-dependent process divided 
into stages, each stage requiring different approaches from the part of the norm promoter. This 
leads to the conclusion that the officials regard the ideal strategy for promoting norms one which 
acknowledges the requirements of the different stages of the process, takes into account the issue 
of context-dependency and which combines offering incentives with fostering socialisation.  
 
Confirming the relevance of this study, the discovered breach shows that we will not understand 
the dynamics of norm promotion without considering also the black box of policy-making. The 
officials‟ beliefs are essential irrespective of the objective accuracy of their conclusions: how they 
conceive the motivations and mechanisms behind value adoption guide the norm promoter‟s 
final choice of strategy. Yet, the result indicates that previous research may have underestimated 
the importance of the interplay between incentives and socialisation. Exploring the nature and 
significance of this interplay is therefore an important task for future research.  
 
The main result in empirical terms is that the interviewed officials regard value promotion as a 
core dimension of the Eastern Partnership. This leads to the conclusion that there is accordance 
between the conceptions held in the administration and the European Union‟s officially declared 
objectives. From a societal point of view, this finding is of crucial importance, indicating that the 
EU‟s frequently stated – and often questioned – ambition to spread values is more than just lip-
service.  
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Sammanfattning  
 
Vad som motiverar aktörer att ta till sig nya värderingar och vilka mekanismer som är viktigast 
för att sprida normer har diskuterats flitigt inom internationella relationer. Likaså har ett flertal 
forskare sökt undersöka betydelsen av Europeiska Unionens ofta upprepade mål att sprida 
grundläggande värderingar. Tidigare forskning har emellertid missat att ta hänsyn till en central 
aspekt, nämligen att tjänstemännens förståelse av vad som motiverar normefterlevnad har stor 
betydelse för de stratgier som slutligen används för att sprida normer. I syfte att överbrygga 
denna lucka och öka vår förståelse av normspridning i allmänhet och EU som normspridare i 
synnerhet ställer jag här frågan hur tjänstemän från Europeiska Kommissionen och svenska UD 
som deltog i att utforma EU:s Östliga Partnerskap ser på strategier för att sprida normer.  
 
Med en teoretisk modell bestående av två strategier (external incentives- och social-learning 
model) som analysverktyg undersöker jag i intervjuer med tjänstemännen vilka antaganden som 
låg till grund för policyutformningen. Den viktigaste slutsatsen är att deras förståelse av 
strategierna skiljer sig från litteraturens: emedan litteraturen utmålar dem som alternativa 
uppfattar tjänstemännen dem som komplementära och ömsesidigt förstärkande. Värdespridning 
ses som en kontextberoende process indelat i olika stadier. Eftersom dessa stadier kräver olika 
instrument måste normspridaren använda sig av båda strategiernas verktyg, dvs. både erbjuda 
incitament och främja socialiseringsprocesser. Resultatet bekräftar denna studies relevans genom 
att visa att vi svårligen kan förstå hur och varför normer sprids utan att ta hänsyn till de 
antaganden och idéer som formar strategierna för att göra så – vi måste även beakta 
policyutformningens svarta låda. Att undersöka hur tjänstemännen ser på mekanismer för 
normspridning och efterlevnad är visserligen viktigt oaktat hur rätt de har i sina slutsatser. Dessa 
påverkar ju vilken strategi som slutligen väljs. Vad resultatet emellertid också indikerar är att 
tidigare forskning kan ha underskattat betydelsen av samspelet mellan incitament och socialisering. 
Att undersöka hur och hur mycket detta samspel påverkar normspridningsprocessen är därför en 
viktig uppgift för framtida forskning.  
 
Det från empirisk synvinkel viktigaste resultatet är att tjänstemännen ser värderingsspridning som 
en central del av Östliga Partnerskapet. Det tycks således som att Europeiska Unionens officiellt 
deklarerade mål om att sprida värden reflekteras också i administrationen. Ur ett samhälleligt 
perspektiv är detta en mycket viktig slutsats eftersom det indikerar att den uttalade ambitionen att 
sprida EU:s grundvärden de facto är mer än bara retorik.  
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Appendix 2: Interview guide 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
-Information about the purpose of the thesis 
-Your participation is voluntary and you can end the 
interview at any time.  
-Do you mind if I record our conversation? 
-If I quote you, I will refer to you as civil servant of the 
European Commission/the Swedish MFA. Is this alright?  
-Do you have any questions before we begin the interview? 
-Feel free to interrupt me and ask me to clarify at any time.  
 
 
Introductory questions: 
background information 
 
-What is your job title?  
-What role did you have in the EAP policy making process? 
-Do you have any experience of working with enlargement 
and/or ENP, Euromed?  
 
 
The Eastern Partnership – 
general goals 
 
 
-Overarching purpose with the Eastern Partnership?  
-What problems/challenges is the EaP a solution to? 
-What does the EU seek to attain?  
-Policy-making is often about striking a balance between 
different goals. In your opinion, how did this mark the 
development of the EaP?  
 
 
The Eastern Partnership - 
setup 
 
 
-What were the main motivators for the chosen setup? How 
did you reason in the policy preparations? Elaborate!  
-Some have interpreted the EaP as inspired by enlargement. 
Would you agree with this image?  
-More specifically, it is the methodology or logic of the EaP that 
is considered similar to that of enlargement Do you assess 
that the enlargement experiences guided the shaping of the 
EaP?   
-If so, what were the main reasons for making use of this 
logic? 
-Did you discuss possible disadvantages of this approach?  
 
 
Norm promotion in the 
Eastern Partnership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-When reading the Commission‟s communication as well as 
the joint declaration, the commitment to shared values comes 
across as very important. Would you agree with this 
interpretation? 
-How important do you assess that the ambition to promote 
these values were in the process of preparing the EaP in 
comparison to other alternative goals? 
-With the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, spreading EU 
core values has become a main objective of the EU (as 
formulated on the EU-webpage about the Treaty). How do 
you conceive the potential of the EaP to be a means in the 
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work towards attaining this goal?  
 
Strategies for norm 
promotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logic/rationale 
 
 
 
 
Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concluding questions: 
 
-If spreading EU-values is in fact an important goal, how do 
you believe that this should be done (in order for the EU to 
be as successful as possible)? 
-Based on your experiences (of enlargement/ENP/Euromed) 
how do you conceive the potential for European Union to 
spread values such as human rights, rule of law etc. through 
the EaP?  
 
 
-In order for the partner – or candidate – countries to adopt 
EU core values, how important do you believe it is that they 
are convinced of the benefits or goodness of these norms? 
 
 
-How come the partner countries adopt EU rules and norms? 
What are the reasons for doing so? 
 
-In your opinion, in general, is it the quality of the norms in 
question or the fact that the EU promotes them that is the 
key explanation? Elaborate!  
 
 
-How important is the use of carrots in this context? (Sticks?) 
-In your opinion, how receptive are the partner countries of 
being convinced of the benefits of these norms?  
- How important is to just be included in the European 
context and talk to already convinced representatives?  
-Does the provision of incentives affect this?  
-In your opinion, do the motives for why partner or 
candidate countries choose to adopt EU rules and values 
effect the implementation and potential impact of the rules/values 
in question? 
 
 
-What would you say is the key to become a successful so 
called “value promoter”? 
-Some describe enlargement as the EU‟s most successful 
foreign policy tool. What do you believe was the key to this 
success? (why did the candidate countries choose to adopt to 
EU norms and rules?) 
 
Summing up - Thank you for taking the time. 
- Is there anything you want to add? 
- Can I call you if I have further questions or want to clarify 
something? 
 
